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In past decades security dilemmas focused on state on state activities 
where the tools of power were only obtainable with the resources a state can 
bring to bear. In moving into a new era where the cyber domain offers state 
and non-state actors the ability to wield low-cost capabilities for high-effect 
actions, understanding the implications of these threats to national security 
is paramount.  
This thesis ponders if proposed cyber governance models are effective 
in assessing risk, preventing, and responding to malicious cyber activities. 
Current governance processes for preventing and responding to malicious 
cyber activities are immature and inadequate to manage the requirements of 
an ever-expanding cyber domain. This thesis explores why current 
approaches to implementing security through policy and standards of 
practice have been unsuccessful and concludes that evidence found though 
analyzing multiple case studies shows a lack of coherent risk assessment, 
inadequate prevention and inconsistent responses to malicious cyber 
activities.  
The first chapter explores whether governance approaches designed to 
prevent and deter malicious cyber activities are effective, hypothesizing that 
current governance processes cannot deter or prevent malicious cyber 
activities. Through the analysis of the 2013 Target and the 2014 USIS 
computer network exploitation in relation to three governance approaches 
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explored in the literature review, analysis revealed none provided adequate 
cyber incident prevention.   
The second chapter explores governance approaches to respond to 
malicious cyber activities are effective, hypothesizing that current response 
options are not effective. Through the analysis of the 2014 Sony and 2014 JP 
Morgan Chase malicious cyber incidents, response approaches reviewed were 
inadequate in part because of legal authority but poor risk assessment also 
emerged as a driving factor. 
The final chapter explores whether a state actor, in this case China is a 
risk to critical infrastructure. The chapter theorizes that state actors such as 
China possess the capability to conduct crippling cyberattacks in U.S. critical 
infrastructure. Using the 2003 northeast blackout as an analog the chapter 
concludes that though cyberattacks on U.S. critical infrastructure are 
possible, wide scale full spectrum cyber warfare is unlikely; however the 
threat that state actors pose to the U.S. infrastructure is real, and requires 
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In past decades security dilemmas focused on state on state activities 
where the tools of power were only obtainable with the resources a state can 
bring to bear. As we move into a new era where the cyber domain offers state 
and non-state actors the ability to wield low-cost high-effect capabilities, 
understanding the implications of this new domain to security is paramount. 
To develop policies, doctrine and standards of practice the implications of 
malicious activities with regard to security must be determined. This thesis 
explores why current approaches to implement security through policy 
approaches have been unsuccessful. Indications imply that the reason 
current approaches have failed is lack of attention to the fundamental 
problem of providing security through policies that have little or no deterrent 
effect. 
Throughout history, humanity has found new and interesting ways to 
leverage virtually any medium to conduct commerce and warfare. Naturally, 
the domains of warfare—land, sea, undersea, air, and space—were used in 
the order they were discovered and defined as technology evolved. Commerce 
has also leveraged these same channels for the conduct of private and state 
business. As these domains evolved and their use proliferated, agreements 
emerged to codify conduct, in both peace and crisis, within these domains. 
Arranged in a myriad of treaties, and bilateral and multilateral agreements, 
these accords of peace, laws of war and treaties of trade provide standards for 
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how states conduct themselves in the global commons. Through these pacts, 
states maintain stability by reducing misunderstandings during times of 
harmony and crisis. Some pacts are designed to prevent crises. For example, 
the Chemical Weapons Convention, an international treaty ratified by most 
countries, bans the production, acquisition, and use of chemical weapons, 
thus reducing the risk of war using chemical weapons.1 Other standards 
provide stable infrastructure support, such as the international 
communications standards managed by the International Institute of 
Communications.2 
The cyber domain is a global asset in many ways similar to the space 
domain. However, because much of it manifests virtually the cyber domain is 
distinct from the other domains. It is the first domain that is entirely man 
made and the only domain that exists in all other domains concurrently. 
Cyber is the only domain where actions and reactions can traverse the globe 
almost instantaneously with the click of a button. The cyber domain is unique 
because it equalizes humanity, providing equal power status between nation 
states and even individuals. The cyber domain can also be leveraged for 
malicious effects across normal sovereign boundaries.3 Unlike the physical 
                                            
1 Organisation for the prohibition of chemical weapons. "Convention on the prohibition of the development, 
production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction." Organisation for the prohibition of 
chemical weapons. July 29, 2005. https://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=6357 (accessed 
April 7, 2015). 
2 International Institute of Communications. International Institute of Communications. April 6, 2015. 
http://www.iicom.org/ (accessed April 6, 2015). 
3 Defense Science Board. "Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat." Defense Science Board. 
January 2013. http://www.acq.osd.mil (accessed 09 15, 2013): 46.  
Mandiant. "APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units." Mandiant Intelligence Center Report. February 
18, 2013. http://intelreport.mandiant.com (accessed 09 25, 2013): 2-3. 
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domains of air, sea, land and space, the cyber domain is unique in that 
activities within the domain may not be recognized as malicious, and, even if 
they are recognized as such, there may be no plausible way to determine the 
initiating party.4 Lastly, the cyber domain is the only one in which the 
civilian, government and military portions are deeply intertwined.5 In the 
cyber domain the lines connecting the sectors blur, occasionally fading 
completely, making it extremely difficult to distinguish between civilian, 
government and military actions. 
Chapter 1: Policy Response Approaches 
In the first chapter of this thesis, the current laws, policies, 
regulations, treaties, and other governing documents designed to implement 
standards on the Internet are examined to assess the various governance 
approaches offered. The intent of the chapter is to determine the intended 
effects and overall effectiveness of these policy approaches with regard to 
creating stability, insuring security, and avoiding misunderstandings in any 
response approaches. The chapter hypothesizes that governance approaches 
to date have failed to provide adequate cybersecurity. Further, there may not 
be cyber policy approach that provides security without fundamental changes 
to the base infrastructure of the Internet. 
                                            
4 Ashford, Warwick. "Problems in attributing cyberattacks could foil US sanctions against hackers." Computer 
Weekly, April 14, 2015: 4. 
Schmidt, Howard, interview by Cameron and Mustafa Safdar Parsons. Defending Cyberspace: The View from 
Washington (April 11, 2011). 
5 Defense Science Board. (January 2013): 5. 
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The approaches were grouped into three categories for ease of 
assessment: polycentric governance, state centric governance, and active 
defense. The identified governance approaches are examined through the 
analysis of two cyber incident case studies.  
The first case presented is a private sector centered cyber incident: the 
2013 computer network exploitation on Target stores. This malicious cyber 
incident provided an analog to evaluate the various methods of governance 
with what happened. The second case study in this chapter was a 
comprehensive look at the U.S. Investigations Services computer network 
exploitation of 2014. This case was chosen to represent an example of a 
malicious cyber incident where the government, through multiple legal 
vectors, has more authority to intervene than in the Target case. 
The chapter shows that perhaps the best model for governance is a 
combination of polycentric governance, state centric governance, and active 
defense. The ultimate solution may need to be a fundamental change to the 
base structure of the Internet that provides the security necessary in a world 
where the technologies driving forward innovation and growth is the same 
one that may be the vehicle to cause the next world war. 
Chapter 2: Economic Impacts of Malicious Cyber Incident 
Response 
The second chapter in this series examines the threat to the United 
States economy through malicious cyber activities and the possible responses. 
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Current response options are tested using two case studies to determine if 
the options available provide adequate solutions. The chapter hypothesizes 
that the response options available (e.g. active defense and state centric) do 
not result in timely response to malicious cyber activities. Furthermore, in 
order to respond to malicious cyber activities fundamental changes to 
response approaches must be made.  
The chapter reviews two recent cyber incidents: 2014 computer 
network exploitation at JP Morgan Chase and a 2014 cyberattack at Sony. 
These cases were chosen to compare and contrast the government and 
industry response to each incident. The robust government reaction to the 
Sony cyberattack in contrast to the JP Morgan Chase computer network 
exploitation incident is examined in this chapter, since the relative risk to 
national security in the JP Morgan Chase case is higher than that of the 
Sony attack.6  
The chapter concludes that despite contrasting views regarding the 
attribution of the Sony attacks and the subsequent government response the 
U.S. government does not have a sufficient method to assess cyber incident 
risk factors.7 The lack of timely weighted risk assessment is a factor that 
leaves the government and industry unable to respond to malicious cyber 
incidents in a more effective way. Future solutions will have to address the 
                                            
6 Department of Homeland Security. (November 2013).  




current legal issues that hamper government and private industry 
collaboration.8 
Chapter 3: Threat to Critical Infrastructure  
The final chapter of this thesis explores the risk to United States 
critical infrastructure by cyber actors using Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
techniques on networked computer command and control and supporting 
systems.9 The chapter assesses malicious cyber actor capabilities and intent, 
examining the vulnerability of the select targets, mitigations to those 
vulnerabilities currently in place, and potential consequences of an attack to 
the selected targets. Potential mitigation techniques for the assessed 
vulnerabilities are evaluated for effectiveness and practicality of 
implementation.  
The chapter approaches the assessment by defining the threat through 
a standard model. The focus of the chapter is on the capabilities and intent of 
malicious actors using a Chinese state actor model. The case studies looked 
at the 2003 blackout in northeastern United States and Canada. The various 
cyber incident vectors were compared to the event to determine the feasibility 
of a similar incident occurring from state sponsored malicious cyber activities. 
                                            
8 Fischer, Eric A., Edward C. Liu, John W. Rollins and Catherine A. Theohary. The 2013 Cybersecurity Executive 
Order: Overview and Considerations for Congress. Report, Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C.: 
International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center, December. 
Givens, Austen D., and Nathan E. Busch. "Integrating Federal Approaches to Post-Cyberattack Mitigation." Journal 
of Homeland Security & Emergency Management (International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center) 
10, no. 1 (April 2013): 1-28. 
9 Department of Homeland Security. dhs.gov. November 15, 2013. http://www.dhs.gov/what-critical-infrastructure 
(accessed 11 15, 2013). 
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The chapter concludes that though there is a possibility that state 
sponsored cyber teams could disable, disrupt and even destroy U.S. critical 
infrastructure, the evidence suggests that wide scale full spectrum cyber 
warfare is not currently feasible. However, in many cases even minor attacks 
to critical infrastructure are dangerous due to unpredictable ripple effects.   
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Chapter 1: Policy Response Approaches 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the current laws, policies, regulations, treaties, 
and other governing documents that attempt to implement standards on the 
Internet. The governance approaches identified in the literature review are 
used to analyze two cyber incident case studies. The analysis is used to 
determine the intended effects and overall effectiveness of these policy 
approaches with regard to creating stability, insuring security, and avoiding 
misunderstandings. Next, the chapter presents a literature review, and then 
explores each case, concluding that there is no evidence that any of the 
examined policy processes would deter or prevent malicious cyber incidents 
from a determined malicious actor.    
Much of the current discussion about U.S. cyber policy focuses on the 
establishment of fair use agreements, cyber defense, and cyber normality and 
avoids more difficult policy discussions that must define a cyberattack and 
what types of attacks are an act of war.10 While this chapter does not explore 
the topic, research is needed in the area of defining reasonable justification 
for the conduct of cyber, conventional, or nuclear retaliation following a 
cyber-enabled attack. What this chapter seeks to explore are the conceptual 
solutions for cybersecurity through policy regulation, standards of conduct, 
                                            
10 Coldebella, Gus P., and Brian M. White. "Foundational Questions Regarding the Federal Role in Cybersecurity." 
Journal Of National Security Law & Policy (International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center) 4, no. 1 
(January 2010): 242.  
Contreras, Jorge L., Laura Denardis, and Melanie Teplinsky. "Mapping Today's Cybersecurity Landscape." 
American University Law Review (Index to Legal Periodicals & Books) 62, no. 5 (June 2013): 1121. 
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treaties, rules, laws and any other concepts being put forth. Some of these 
concepts have been captured officially (e.g. presidential directives), while 
others have only been theorized.  
Unlike physical domains, cyber is unique because malicious actions are 
often mistaken as non-malicious, or, not detected at all. The reality that even 
recognized malicious activities might not be feasibly tracked back to the 
initiating party further complicates response options.11 In the cyber domain, 
the enemy is transparent and often actions that resemble attacks can 
resemble defense, and vice-versa. Further, actions in the cyber domain often 
do not have a correlating effect in the physical world. This has implications 
for both the attacker and the defender. The attacker often cannot assess 
damage and defenders cannot assess if the activity was an attack.12 These 
factors make the cyber domain one of constant ambiguity, resulting in 
decreased ability to avoid misunderstandings. 
Establishing policies for the cyber domain is crucial to avoid 
miscalculations between nation states. The unique aspects of the cyber 
domain and the overall infancy of the globally connected Internet make the 
development of acceptable laws and policies governing the fair use of the 
cyber domain complex. Without the establishment of policies, fair use, and 
                                            
11 Ashford, Warwick. (April 14, 2015): 4. 
12 Greenberg, Andy. McAfee Explains The Dubious Math Behind Its 'Unscientific' $1 Trillion Data Loss Claim. 
August 03, 2012. http://www.forbes.com (accessed 10 21, 2013). 
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conduct agreements, malicious activities could spiral out of control causing 
cyber, conventional, or even nuclear war.  
What is the Cyber Domain? 
What can be asserted with minimal debate is that cybersecurity and 
the cyber domains are amorphous concepts. To define cybersecurity it is 
necessary to first develop a sense of what the cyber domain is and from what, 
or in many cases, from whom it is being secured.13 Multiple actors seek to 
exploit cybersecurity vulnerabilities to conduct nefarious activities for a 
myriad of reasons. There are several suggested ways to define the cyber 
domain. Cyber domain has been described as a new war fighting domain, a 
global commodity, and a communications system. Additionally, some see the 
cyber domain as a combination of all three.14  
A fitting way to understand the cyber domain is to imagine a non-
biological entity that is evolving on a continuous basis. The cyber domain was 
never designed to be secure; it was designed to communicate data between 
trusted actors. The lack of integrated security combined with contiguous 
evolution suggests that any attempt to add security is extremely difficult. 
Regardless of how the cyber domain is defined, the underlying insecurity of 
the system drives a serious debate with regard to cybersecurity and the 
                                            
13 Defense Science Board. (January 2013): 21. 
14 Hunker, Jeffrey. "U.S. International Policy for Cybersecurity: Five Issues That Won't Go Away." Journal of 
National Security Law & Policy (International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center) 4, no. 1 (2010): 197-
216. 
Malone, Eloise F., and Michael Malone. "The "wicked problem" of Cybersecurity policy: analysis of United States 
and Canadian policy response." Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 19, no. 2 (August 2013): 158-177. 
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policies, laws and regulatory actions that may be required to maintain the 
integrity of the system.15  
Perhaps the most vexing issue for lawmakers to overcome in 
mandating cybersecurity is the ownership of the cyber domain. One reason 
this adds complexity is an assessment that 85% of the U.S. controlled critical 
cyber infrastructure is privately owned.16 The portions that are federally 
owned, in many cases, also transmit data over privately owned equipment or 
infrastructure such as underground fiber optics, switching stations, and 
electrical power generation.17 The private nature of this infrastructure makes 
regulation very difficult without violating constitutional protections. There 
are other competing factors in the development of cybersecurity solutions 
such as the separate, and in many cases competing, security implementation 
actors: the national security and intelligence community, the military, law 
enforcement, legal and regulatory experts, companies, and cyber privacy 
advocates.18 
The complexity of the cyber domain and the breadth of conceivable 
threats that can be projected through the cyber domain require careful study 
                                            
15 United States Senate, One Hundred Sixth Congress. Internet Security: Hearing before the Subcommittee On 
Communications of the Committee On Commerce, Science, and Transportation. Second Session, Washington, D.C.: 
G.P.O., 2000. 
16 Flowers, Angelyn, Sherali Zeadally, and Acklyn Murray. "Cybersecurity and US Legislative Efforts to address 
Cybercrime." Journal Of Homeland Security & Emergency Management (International Security & Counter 
Terrorism Reference Center) 10, no. 1 (April 2013): 1-27. 
17 Defense Science Board. (January 2013): 76. 
18 Malone, Eloise F., and Michael Malone. (August 2013): 171. 
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and consideration to determine the most equitable method of security while 
maintaining freedoms protected under the constitution.19  
Literature Review 
This literature review helps identify ideas that resonate in the 
assessed literature, including the ideas that show commonality and the 
unique thoughts regarding cybersecurity policy. The debate over 
cybersecurity, and, importantly, by whom and how the cyber domain should 
be secured, has multiple complexities. Two of these complexities include who 
should secure the Internet and how it should be secured. Opinions on 
Internet security management policies often follow closely with who manages 
them, though they do not always synchronize. 
Polycentric Governance Approach 
There are multiple viewpoints regarding who should regulate the 
Internet. One of the most discussed ideas is polycentric governance.20 The 
concept is rooted in the heterogeneous nature of the cyber domain where no 
one individual, state, or international body has full ownership or 
management over the whole domain.21 This concept is most consistent with 
the current ownership model of the cyber domain. Establishing behavior 
                                            
19 McAfee. "A Good Decade for Cybercrime." www.mcafee.com. December 29, 2010. http://www.mcafee.com (accessed 
October 21, 2013): 4. 
20 Brechbuhl, Hans, et al. "Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure: Developing Cybersecurity Policy." 
Information Technology for Development (Business Source Complete) 16, no. 1 (January 2010): 83-91. 
Contreras, Jorge L., Laura Denardis, and Melanie Teplinsky. (June 2013): 1121.  
Shackelford, Scott J, and Amanda N Craig. "Beyond the New "Digital Divide": Analyzing the Evolving Role of 
National Governments in Internet Governance and Enhancing Cybersecurity." Stanford Journal Of International 
Law (Academic Search Complete) 50, no. 1 (2014): 119-184. 
Singh, J. P. "Multilateral Approaches to Deliberating Internet Governance." Policy & Internet 1 (2009): 91-111. 
21 Defense Science Board. (January 2013): 1. 
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norms for the cyber domain is a concept that manifests individually but is 
also present in the polycentric governance framework.22 The concept is rooted 
in the idea that through the development of cyber norms Internet users will 
maintain security through best practices. Other ideas in the literature 
revolve around protectionist themes such as centralizing government 
cybersecurity, legislating ‘voluntary’ standards, and moving to an active 
defense posture.23 
While the basic idea of polycentric governance is common, the concept 
manifests in several ways throughout the literature. In several studies, the 
authors only discuss the idea of polycentricism within the state itself.24 This 
view focuses on the interaction between the state and commercial or private 
actors. The model presents a view where the cyber domain is regulated 
through a collaborative effort with representatives from each of the 
interested parties to determine best practices and implementation. In this 
concept, the model accepts the amorphous nature of the Internet and 
attempts to overcome the complexity by accepting it and dividing the 
responsibility for security among a wide range of actors.  
                                            
22 Brechbuhl, Hans, et al. (January 2010): 87.  
Hunker, Jeffrey. (2010): 197-216. 
23 Flowers, Angelyn, Sherali Zeadally, and Acklyn Murray. (April 2013): 1-27.  
Harknett, Richard J., John P. Callaghan, and Rudi Kauffman. "Leaving Deterrence Behind: War-Fighting and 
National Cybersecurity." Journal Of Homeland Security & Emergency Management (International Security & 
Counter Terrorism Reference Center) 7, no. 1 (January 2010): 1-24. 
Hunker, Jeffrey. (2010): 197-216.  
Newmeyer, Kevin P. "Who Should Lead U.S. Cybersecurity Efforts?" PRISM Security Studies Journal (International 
Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center) 3, no. 2 (March 2012): 115-126. 
24 Broggi, Jeremy J. "Building on Executive Order 13,636 to Encourage Information Sharing for Cybersecurity 
Purposes." Harvard Journal Of Law & Public Policy (Business Source Complete) 37, no. 2 (2014): 653-676. 
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In other examples of polycentric approaches, the multipronged 
governance structure accounts for the global nature of the cyber domain by 
suggesting that states, businesses, individuals, and international bodies must 
work together to maintain the integrity of the system.25  This approach 
suggests that security must also be accomplished through bilateral and 
multilateral security and conduct agreements. The idea of implementing a 
governance structure to account for the interconnectedness of the cyber 
domain is one of necessity in some cases and practicality in others. The 
necessity argument often falls into several categories that revolve around 
enforcing laws.26 These are usually criminal laws but states and individuals 
are concerned with the enforcement of trading rules and procedures as well 
as international contract laws, copyrights, and patents.  
The strengths of polycentric approaches are in the acceptance of the 
plurality of ownership, the lack of defined borders and boundaries, and the 
complexity of the interconnectedness of the cyber domain. The authors who 
explored governance through the lens of ownership plurality gave suggestions 
that encompassed more than just a specific nation state’s perceived portion of 
the Internet.27 In turn, this allowed the authors to consider solutions that, if 
enacted, could be used for more than one stakeholder. 
                                            
25 Brechbuhl, Hans, et al. (January 2010): 83-91.  
DeNardis, L. "E-Governance Policies for Interoperability and Open Standards." Policy & Internet 2 (2010): 129–164. 
26 Newmeyer, Kevin P. (March 2012): 115-126 
27 Contreras, Jorge L., Laura Denardis, and Melanie Teplinsky. (June 2013): 1113-1130.  
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Multipronged or polycentric governance arguments lack discussion 
regarding the difficulty of resolving complex issues between the relevant 
states, the government institutions, corporations, and private citizens. Some 
even suggest that the traditional regulatory and legal procedures will not 
work at all.28 Some of the studies attempt to present models for new global 
Internet governance institutions or at least recognize that without some new 
form of regulating body the idea of polycentric or multipronged governance is 
not a viable solution.29  
State Centric Governance Approach 
A separate common theme presents a model of state centric regulation 
and control over the cyber domain.30 These ideas appear to revolve around 
the basic tenant of getting one’s own house in order first.31 Most of these 
solutions seek government action through legislation that involves 
centralizing control over government cybersecurity, improving cyber 
governance procedures, promoting cyber norms and encouraging private 
sector participation with a government lead.32 For more than fifteen years, 
                                            
28 Harknett, Richard J., John P. Callaghan, and Rudi Kauffman. (January 2010): 1-24.  
Malone, Eloise F., and Michael Malone. (August 2013): 158-177. 
29 Contreras, Jorge L., Laura Denardis, and Melanie Teplinsky. (June 2013): 1113-1130 
30 Broggi, Jeremy J. (2014): 653-676.  
Hunker, Jeffrey. (2010): 197-216.  
Newmeyer, Kevin P. (March 2012): 115-126.  
U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection: Cybersecurity Guidance Is Available, but More 
Can Be Done to Promote Its Use. Report to Congressional Committees, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability 
Office, 2011. 
31 Coldebella, Gus P., and Brian M. White. (January 2010): 233-245. 
32 Broggi, Jeremy J. (2014): 653-676.  
Flowers, Angelyn, Sherali Zeadally, and Acklyn Murray. (April 2013): 1-27.  
Hunker, Jeffrey. (2010): 197-216.  
Newmeyer, Kevin P. (March 2012): 115-126.  
Shackelford, Scott J, and Amanda N Craig. (2014): 119-184. 
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the United States government has recognized the need to manage 
cybersecurity. Yet as multiple United States Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reports suggest, there has been minimal progress.33 
Studies of state centric regulation tend to focus on activities that 
concentrate on regulating state controlled networks.34 This approach suggests 
that to manage the security of critical infrastructure the government must 
first secure its own networks. While there have been multiple proposals for 
making this achievable, to date, the concept is still very difficult to 
implement. 35  The implementation of standardized security practices by 
governments can be difficult, however, because numerous stakeholders want 
to maintain control over their individual networks. 36  A centralized 
government management structure for cybersecurity implies some loss of 
control by the individual stakeholders such as the State Department or 
Defense Department. Further, governmental structure and laws regulating 
                                            
33 U.S. Government Accountability Office. Internet Infrastructure: DHS Faces Challenges In Developing a Joint 
Public/private Recovery Plan. Report to Congressional Requesters, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2006. 
U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. Critical Infrastructure Protection: More Comprehensive Planning Would Enhance 
the Cybersecurity of Public Safety Entities' Emerging Technology. Report to the Congressional Requesters, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2014. 
U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. Cybersecurity: National Strategy, Roles, and Responsibilities Need to Be Better 
Defined and More Effectively Implemented. Report to Congressional Requestors, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. 
Accountability Office, 2013. 
U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. Cybersecurity: Progress Made but Challenges Remain in Defining and 
Coordinating the Comprehensive National Initiative. Report to Congressional Requesters, Washinton, D.C.: U.S. 
Govt. Accountability Office, 2010. 
U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. Cyberspace Policy: Executive Branch Is Making Progress Implementing 2009 
Policy Review Recommendations, but Sustained Leadership Is Needed. Report to Congressional Requesters, 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2010. 
U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. Cyberspace: United States Faces Challenges In Addressing Global Cybersecurity 
and Governance . Report to Congressional Requesters, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Accountability Office, 2010. 
34 Harknett, Richard J., John P. Callaghan, and Rudi Kauffman. (January 2010): 1-24.  
Hunker, Jeffrey. (2010): 197-216. Newmeyer, Kevin P. (March 2012): 115-126. 
35 DeNardis, L. (2010): 129–164.  
Klimburg, Alexander. National Cybersecurity Framework Manual. NATO CCD COE Publications, 2012. 
36 U.S. Govt. Accountability Office. “Cybersecurity: Progress Made but Challenges Remain in Defining and 
Coordinating the Comprehensive National Initiative”. (2010). 
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access to information can also make it difficult to centrally manage security. 
For example, there are many laws that pertain to sharing of domestic 
information between intelligence agencies but the relative effectiveness of the 
laws comes into question upon implementation.37  
Additionally, studies suggest the government may be attempting to 
move beyond managing its own networks and instead expand into the private 
sector through various legal and cooperative frameworks. Recently the 
Federal Communications Commission voted on the enactment of a set of 
rules that will attempt to govern some activities on the Internet.38 Known as 
the Net Neutrality or Open Internet rules, they seek to set commercial 
practices in place to manage Internet traffic.39 One of the other activities 
slowly being adapted from a voluntary action to a requirement is the 
disclosure of cybersecurity risks to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.40  
Some of the studies analyzed the relationship between the government 
and the authorities under which it might regulate the Internet. Opderbeck 
argued that legal authority to regulate the Internet was mired in 
constitutional protections and thus difficult to navigate with laws and 
regulations.41 Regardless, he argued that the Executive branch should have 
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emergency authority to take unilateral actions.42 This argument is contrasted 
by assessments in other writings that suggest the authority to take 
emergency executive action requires capabilities that do not exist. For 
example, Opderbeck explored the possibility of using the Communications 
Act of 1934 in allowing for an Internet kill switch.43 The assumption that in 
an emergency the President or an act of Congress could authorize the cutoff 
of Internet services may be politically and even legally viable in some 
instances; however, literature indicates that the difficulty resides in 
executing the action.44 
The writings in the state centric governance group are strong in the 
assessment of current shortfalls in the abilities of the United States to 
manage its own government networks.45 The writings also take into account 
the difficulties in regulating the infrastructure that the vast majority of the 
Internet traffic traverses. This recognition allows the authors to parse this 
complex issue into seemingly manageable portions. Using that process they 
excel at describing the probable ways the government could take action to 
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shore up defenses and to implement proactive steps to thwart future 
threats.46  
The shortfalls in these writings focus on centralized solutions for an 
amorphous problem. The emphasis on centralized solutions ignores many of 
the issues the polycentric governance authors suggest. These writings in 
many cases either dismiss or ignore the global nature of the cyber domain 
and the regulatory issues that encompasses.  
Active Defense Approach 
The literature reviewed contained several unique thoughts, however 
the most compelling thought that appeared in a couple different forms 
revolved around the idea of the United States setting cyber deterrence aside 
and adopting a full war-fighting posture.47  This idea was unique in its 
presentation by Harknett but other authors attempted to provide language in 
their assessments that leaned in the direction of a war-fighting posture 
through the suggestion of active defense, moving away from passivity and 
defining the justification for military action in the cyber domain.48 
While an interesting thought, the weakness in this argument remains: 
there is no current precedent for the conduct of war in the cyber domain. 
                                            
46 Contreras, Jorge L., Laura DeNardis, and Melanie Teplinsky. (June 2013): 1113-1130.  
Flowers, Angelyn, and Sherali Zeadally. "US Policy on Active Cyber Defense." Journal Of Homeland Security & 
Emergency Management (International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center) 11, no. 2 (June 2014). 
Hunker, Jeffrey. (2010): 197-216. 
47 Harknett, Richard J., John P. Callaghan, and Rudi Kauffman. (January 2010): 1-24. 
48 Flowers, Angelyn, and Sherali Zeadally. (June 2014).  
Hunker, Jeffrey. (2010): 197-216.  
Schwitz, John G. "Risk-Based Cybersecurity Policy." American Intelligence Journal (International Security & 
Counter Terrorism Reference Center) 29, no. 1 (March 2011): 115-125. 
  
 20 
While there are words on paper that define cyber defense, cyber strategy and 
cyber policy, the doctrine, training, methodologies, tactics, techniques and 
procedures are far from perfect.49 The authors suggest one solution is active 
defense: activities conducted to retaliate against a malicious actor or take 
other proactive measures rather than simply blocking them. The writings 
suggest that active defense actions may not be in the best interest of those 
executing them. Active defense methodologies could escalate a cyberattack if 
misunderstood by the attacker as an offensive action.50 
The strength in this argument is the acknowledgement that 
governments need to categorize malicious activities and respond to them in a 
manner appropriate for the risk and damage the activities could cause to 
state and private property. This argument also looks only at the state and its 
needs, which in many cases is much easier to control and manage.51 These 
writings also lack attention to the implications of strengthening the defenses 
the government-controlled side of the cyber domain that rely on the privately 
controlled portions to function.52 Lastly, though the authors do consider that 
active defense may escalate into conventional or even nuclear war they do not 
provide suggested solutions to avoid these possible risks. 
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Regulating and defending the cyber domain implies a firm 
understanding of the costs and benefits of applying those regulations in 
response to defined risks. A recent analysis by Mandiant, detailing Chinese 
cyber intrusions and the subsequent theft of intellectual property from 
commercial company networks, emphasizes the urgency of implementing 
policies and procedures that support the security of U.S. owned cyber 
systems. 53  To analyze the proposed approaches two case studies are 
examined to determine if there is reasonable methodology to thwarting or 
mitigating the effects of cyber enabled attacks. Through analysis, the ideas of 
state centric regulation, polycentric cooperative governance, and active 
defense are tested as options against these case studies to determine their 
validity for combating future incidents.  
2013 Target Computer Network Exploitation 
The November 2013 computer network exploitation on Target’s 
security payments system was, at the time, the largest breach of customer 
information in history.54 Between 27 November and 15 December, hackers 
suspected to have originated in Russia lifted the credit card information of 40 
million Target customers. 55  Further, the company confirmed that the 
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personally identifiable information (PII) of as many as 70 million customers 
was stolen.56 The assessment determined that the likely origination of the 
hack was stolen credentials of a third party service company.57 
The malicious activities began with the perpetrators inserting malware 
into the Target network that has been described as not very sophisticated.58 
Through the use of the exploited credentials the hackers took their time to 
test their malware on a few of the companies’ cash registers before pushing 
the malware out to most of the retailers’ store’s point of sale machines.59 
Despite the perpetrators maneuvering the Target network for several weeks, 
the company did not detect the intrusion.60 In the end, the Israeli based 
company Seculert assessed that approximately 11 gigabytes of data were 
extracted from Target servers.61 
Target had taken proactive steps to mitigate these types of malicious 
cyber activities; in fact, six months before the incident they had begun 
installing cybersecurity tools from FireEye.62 The inclusion of detection tools 
in the security suite was designed to detect malware just like that used by 
the malicious actors.63 The initial reaction by Target leadership was typical of 
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company responses – to claim standards were followed, insist steps are being 
taken and that an investigation is underway to determine the facts.64 What 
the executive team may not have initially known was that the $1.6 million 
dollar investment in FireEye had actually worked.65 In fact, assessments say 
that had the security team opted to let the security suite automatically block 
malware, the intrusion would have been thwarted before it even began.66 
FireEye caught the perpetrators uploading the malware that 
ultimately acted as the exfiltration tool that moved the stolen data off Target 
servers to staging servers.67 When FireEye alerted, the security team in India 
flagged the alert and notified the Target security operations center in 
Minnesota.68 Unfortunately, the alert was not responded to and the mass 
exfiltration continued. 69  Target executives noted that the company was 
unaware of the breach until the Justice Department notified them on or near 
13 December when there systems discovered the malicious activities.70 
Following the meeting with the Justice Department, Target hired a 
third party to investigate and confirm the extent of the incident.71 Following 
the assessment, Target privately confirmed the malicious activities on 15 
December followed by a public acknowledgment on 19 December.72  
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The Riley article suggests that several factors could have contributed 
to the failure of the IT security personnel from responding.73 These factors 
include a lack of trust for the new FireEye software, an absence of Security 
Operation Center leadership due to a recent resignation, and failure to follow 
up on alerts from both the software and its overseas watch floor.74 Some other 
factors that may have contributed to the lack of action include distrust in the 
overseas watch floor personnel, possibly a lack of training on the new FireEye 
system and proper response options despite the lengthy certification period.75 
Lastly, secure segregation of the Target networks and sub-networks did not 
appear to be properly configured.76 
The breach going public is the only incentive Target needed to appear 
to be interested in tightening up their security. There is generally very little 
real incentive for companies to admit they have a problem and even less 
incentive to spend large sums of money to implement change. As the 
Bloomberg article indicated, the stock of Target really did not suffer following 
the breach.77 However, Target did suffer a short-term immediate effect, with 
a 46 percent dip in sales for the quarter.78  
The absence of a decline in stock price is not to imply that there will 
not be severe long-term effects. Overall, Target estimates the cost of the to 
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date (February 2015) at over $248 million, with a rough estimate of 
fraudulent charges between $240 million and $2.2 billion.79 Target has not 
seen the end with the possibility of further fines by the Payment Cards 
Industry Council of up to $1.1 billion and a solid 90 lawsuits pending.80 
Further, Target laid off personnel at its headquarters and worldwide as sales 
dropped.81 Despite the hack, just a year later Target had returned to its 
profitable state, surpassing forecasted revenues with a posting of $17.73 
billion, which could mean that the economic effects may have already 
subsided.82  
2014 U.S. Investigations Services Computer Network 
Exploitation 
The August 2014 computer network exploitation on U.S. Investigations 
Services LLC (USIS) provides an example of a private organization whose 
security practices must conform to government standards because of 
contractual obligations. 83  This case is pertinent because the company 
breached was the majority provider of federal background checks for security 
clearances.84 The USIS breech also had little or no immediate known effects 
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from the malicious activities directly relating to the data loss but rather there 
were immediate and lasting secondary effects to the company. 
Despite the government-approved cybersecurity measures including 
perimeter protection, antivirus, user authentication and intrusion-detection, 
purported Chinese actors penetrated the companies’ networks. 85  Reports 
suggest that the breech into USIS networks was a state sponsored attempt to 
steal copies of background investigation files for federal government and 
federal contract employees.86 The breech exposed at least 25,000 employee 
background investigations that reveal in depth personal information. 87 
Similar to the JP Morgan Chase event the USIS event went unnoticed by the 
company for several months.88 Though USIS reported the incident to the 
government, once it was noticed USIS delayed reporting the loss to the public 
for a few more months.89  
The response to the USIS exploitation by the government was swift. 
The government suspended and subsequently cancelled contracts for services 
provided by USIS for services to The Department of Homeland Security 
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(DHS) and The Office of Personnel Management. 90  The resulting 
cancellations caused USIS to lay off 2,500 employees nationwide.91  The 
company suffered massive capital loss from the cyber incident. USIS lost an 
estimated $510 million in business (approximately $320 million from The 
Office of Personnel Management and approximately and $190 million from 
The Department of Homeland Security) overnight.92  
Following the incident, the government chose to shift the business to 
other contractors and to use in house solutions, moving some of the business 
to competitor companies such as CACI and KeyPoint Government 
Solutions.93 Ironically, KeyPoint suffered a breech in its computer systems in 
December 2014 that resulted in the exposure of approximately 40,000 federal 
employee background records. This exposure suggested that government 
actions to mitigate the breech were ineffective.94 
Analysis 
Polycentric Governance Model 
Applying the polycentric governance model to the Target cyber 
intrusion shows both strengths and weaknesses. The strength of the 
polycentric governance model in this case is the concept of establishing cyber 
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norms.95 The polycentric governance argument promotes cyber norms as a 
method to enlist users that maintain security through best practices. In 
theory, this would enhance the ability of Target to avoid incidents in the 
cyber domain though collective action of users outside of their company 
owned networks. The polycentric approach of collaborative interaction 
between the government, companies and private citizens argues that Target 
would benefit from standardization, notification and other defensive 
measures. The global approach of polycentric governance argues that a 
multipronged governance structure that includes states, businesses, 
individuals, and international bodies working to maintain the integrity of the 
system will enhance the security of companies like Target. This type of 
structure would benefit the system as a whole.96  
The polycentric governance theory appears to be a logical approach to a 
very difficult problem, e.g. preventing Target-type malicious cyber incidents. 
Where the approach fails is the faith-based application of standards within 
the collective and the legal pitfalls each member of the collective must 
identify and mitigate to participate in the voluntary scheme. This view 
focuses on the interaction between the state and commercial and private 
actors. In this example, a nonprofessional can determine that there will be 
severe difficulties in sharing information between government agencies, 
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companies and private individuals; all have different motivations, legal 
obligations, and costs to consider.  
Further, the global polycentric governance approach exacerbates the 
previous indigenous polycentric approach by ignoring the extremely complex 
relationships that must be created to implement a global strategy. Neither of 
these approaches addresses how they would actually prevent incidents like 
that at Target from occurring. These approaches also disregard the cost 
associated with implementing and maintaining even a rudimentary 
polycentric governance approach. The polycentric approach suggests that the 
stakeholders would share resources to compound the security interest of each 
other. Companies and government stakeholders would have to implicitly 
trust each other and refrain from suing if the resources of one stakeholder 
damaged another. In a country fraught with litigious actions by individuals, 
this is an unlikely outcome. 
The USIS case is a version of the polycentric governance model focused 
on the cooperation of the state and the company to provide a method to 
protect individuals’ information. Through contractual language, the 
government set the behavior norms for the company and the company used 
approved methodologies to implement and sustain those behavior norms.97 
This model ultimately failed, in part because the company network was used 
for business beyond that which served the government client. As reported by 
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Fox News, the origin of the malicious cyber exploitation event was a 
weakness in a third party network that had access to the USIS network.98  
The polycentric governance model should account for this type of 
connection but the standards currently in place do not account for the 
diversity in the cyber domain. In response to the recognition of this shortfall, 
Senator Tom Carper (D-DE) suggested congressional action to pass the 
Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014. 99  Despite the 
political rhetoric, the implementation of the act promotes real-time 
automated security measures. The delineation of agency roles does not 
provide proactive steps to thwart criminals or states from attacking systems; 
rather this legislature is another attempt to respond in the aftermath of a 
malicious cyber incident.100 
The main difference between the Target case and the USIS case is the 
involvement of the government. In the Target case, the government only 
acted as a law enforcement entity to provide post facto attempts to prosecute 
the perpetrators of the theft. In the USIS case, the government was acting as 
oversight, customer and law enforcement. In neither case does the polycentric 
governance model appear to be a viable solution to preventing or mitigating 
malicious cyber activities. Though the analysis shows that there is not a 
formal polycentric approach to cybersecurity, the concept presented in 
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multiple studies suggests that the scenarios that led to the eventual theft in 
both cases would have played out approximately the same way because the 
actors perpetrating the malicious cyber activities would not have been part of 
the cooperative polycentric governance. Without willing compliance of 
malicious actors to follow rules, the polycentric model is limited in its ability 
to thwart malicious cyber activities. However, the more willing participants 
in the governance structure the ability of the collective to blunt incidents and 
respond more rapidly in times of crisis increases. 
State Centric Governance Model 
Applying the state centric governance model to the Target computer 
network exploitation is very difficult because state centric regulation and 
control does not easily extend to private networks. 101 This model suggests 
government action through legislation that involves centralizing control over 
government cybersecurity, improving cyber governance procedures, 
promoting cyber norms and encouraging private sector participation.102 The 
main fault in this argument is the dismissal of the ownership of the cyber 
domain. Most of the cyber domain, including 85% of the U.S. controlled 
critical cyber infrastructure, is privately owned. This private ownership 
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includes the Target servers that were infiltrated. 103  The state centric 
approach implies that the government will provide security through 
regulation and enforcement. In political terms, this is a great campaign 
sound bite; however, in practice it is very difficult to implement when the 
government is unable to secure its own networks. The focus on centralized 
solutions for an amorphous problem lacks the fluidity required overcoming 
the evolving cybersecurity challenge. Further, the legal authority to regulate 
the cyber domain is mired in constitutional protections and difficult-to-
navigate laws and regulations. 104  The state centric approach, like the 
polycentric approach, also fails to suggest how the regulation of the cyber 
domain by the state will prevent or mitigate cyber intrusions. 
The USIS case is one that could benefit from the concept of a state 
centric governance model. If the federal government was able to centralize 
control over government cybersecurity, then improving cyber governance 
procedures and promoting cyber norms private sector participation might 
actually be achievable.105 A set of standards to manage networks that are 
flexible and implementable by all individuals, businesses, and government 
agencies might actually lead to a defendable network infrastructure. The 
USIS breech is a case where the stakes of the government and the company 
                                            
103 Flowers, Angelyn, Sherali Zeadally, and Acklyn Murray. (April 2013): 1-27. 
104 Opderbeck, David W. (May 2012): 795-845 
105 Broggi, Jeremy J. (2014): 653-676.  
Flowers, Angelyn, Sherali Zeadally, and Acklyn Murray. (April 2013): 1-27.  
Hunker, Jeffrey. (2010): 197-216.  
Newmeyer, Kevin P. (March 2012): 115-126.  
Shackelford, Scott J, and Amanda N Craig. (2014): 119-184. 
  
 33 
are intertwined in very real and tangible ways. The government desires to 
maintain the security of personnel records and the company wants to 
maintain profits. Despite the obvious attempt to work together to meet both 
of their requirements, the application of the model ultimately failed.  
As noted in above, the main difference between the Target case and 
the USIS case is the involvement of the government. In the Target case, the 
government only acted as a law enforcement entity to provide post facto 
attempts to prosecute the perpetrators of the theft. In the USIS case, the 
government was acting as oversight, customer and law enforcement. The 
Target case contrasts the USIS case mainly with regard to the quasi-state 
centric approach the government implemented vis–à–vis contractual 
obligations. While Target was under regulatory compliance mandates, the 
contractual obligations placed on USIS in conducting business with the 
government were more consistent with the state centric approach described 
in the literature. 
Active Defense Model 
Applying the active defense model to the Target case is compelling 
because it implies that while active defense may not have prevented the 
initial intrusion, an active defense posture would have allowed the 
government to take action that is more aggressive. 106 If we define deterrence 
as actions that reduce the cost benefit curve for the adversary, then the idea 
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of active defense, moving away from passivity and defining the justification 
for military action in the cyber domain, is the only model that appears to 
actually provide discouragement of malicious activities.107 The shortfall in the 
argument is the focus on the state and its needs. In many cases, the state is 
much easier to control and manage, but the state does not respond to the 
needs of companies and individuals.108 A separate shortfall to active defense 
is the assumption that our military or government in general, has the 
capacity and competency to conduct cyber warfare either to retaliate against 
a malicious actor or to take other proactive measures.  
Congruent with the Target case outcome, there is little evidence that 
an active defense model would have prevented the malicious cyber activities 
on USIS. However, unlike the Target incident, the justification for military 
action in the cyber domain could be more readily argued in the USIS case 
because the information stolen is U.S. Government property. The U.S. 
government, concurrently with the individuals affected, has a legal claim to 
the information that the malicious actors acquired. Thus, the damage caused 
to the state could provide legal justification for offensive or retaliatory action. 
The breadth of action would then be defined through the active defense model 
and applied in cases such as this. 
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The contrast between the two cases once again falls to the role of the 
government. While the Target case reflects very little direct government 
equity, there is potential damage to Target’s market share. In the context of 
protecting national security, however, one could make an argument that the 
potential damage might warrant active defense measures by the government, 
or in this case by Target, in order to prevent possible damage to the U.S. 
economy and Target assets.  
Conclusion  
In a perfect world, the polycentric approach to governance would be 
ideal because the model suggests that everyone with equity in the cyber 
domain willingly commits to a security and conduct framework. Further, the 
failure to meet the standards of the framework places overwhelming pressure 
on the non-compliant actor and/or deters non-compliance from the outset. 
However, without the willing compliance of malicious actors, the polycentric 
model is limited in its ability to thwart malicious cyber activities. This 
approach counts on willing participants to increase the ability of the 
collective to blunt malicious cyber activities and respond more rapidly.109 
The state centric approach, at face value, appears to be a reasonable 
approach to governance given that the state is the normal body of 
governance. However, the lack of jurisdiction over the basic sundries that 
comprise the governed structure suggests that the concept of a state centric 
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approach will not work.110 Further, the risks that state centric approaches 
introduce into the global governance process may even lead to further 
conflict. In a global model with each state attempting to carve out a piece of 
an amorphous domain to reign, the potential for conflict is high.  
The active defense model is perhaps the most disconcerting because 
the term ‘defense’ implies a non-aggressive approach to implementing self-
protection measures. However, the implication is that through active defense 
the perpetrator would suffer some sort of damage should they attack a 
protected enclave.111 The potential for this type of governance to spin out of 
control is high because there is very little understanding of the consequences 
of both the initial attack and the active defense response activities.  
One other option not explored in this chapter is a purely private 
governance process. This governance process would be one that leaves the 
states completely out of the decision-making tree, and compels individuals 
and companies to set standards of conduct on the Internet. More work could 
be done to investigate the potential impacts of this kind of governance; 
however, it is outside the scope of this chapter. 
Perhaps the best model for governance is a combination of all of these 
models. In the short term, the best plan may be to keep all options on the 
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table. The continual evolution of the global commons in complexity compels 
changes to the underlying security infrastructure. As previously mentioned, 
the Internet was never designed to be secure. The solution may need to be a 
fundamental change to the base structure of the Internet that provides the 
security necessary in a world where the technology driving forward 
innovation and growth is the same one that may be the vehicle to cause the 




Chapter 2: Economic Impacts of Malicious Cyber 
Incident Response  
Introduction 
This chapter serves to explore the threat to the United States economy 
through malicious cyber activities. Recent known cyber incidents at JP 
Morgan Chase and Sony are examined to compare the government response 
in each incident. The government response to the Sony cyberattack (which 
had a estimated cost of $35 million) appears to have been an over reaction by 
the government. In contrast, the JP Morgan Chase cyber exploitation (which 
had a estimated of $20 million) appears to have been an under reaction 
because of the greater threat to the U.S. economy in the JP Morgan Chase 
cyber exploitation. Next, the chapter presents a literature review, then 
explores each case, concluding that given the relative threat to the economy 
there appeared to be a failure to properly evaluate the relative risk to 
national security; the response to the two malicious cyber incidents was 
opposite of what should have been expected. 
The scale and impact of malicious cyber events has increased with the 
proliferation of the Internet. These incidents generally result in the theft of 
information such as proprietary industrial processes, intellectual property, 
personal information, military and government secrets, and business 
confidential information including sensitive contract negotiation data. In 
some instances, however, there is intentional damage done to the attacked 
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network.112 Generally, this results in the damage of networks though the 
erasure of information. These malicious activities can cause the compromised 
network to become unusable in the absence of significant reconstitution or 
replacement. 
There is varying opinion regarding the value of the information stolen 
though these computer network exploitation activities, as well as the cost to 
recover, mitigate and stop the activities from continuing.113 Some leaders 
have even described the current state of affairs as the "greatest transfer of 
wealth in history." 114  In a recent survey of private industry incidents, 
respondents estimated costs between $6.3 million and $8.4 million a day just 
for the down time incurred.115 However, these figures only consider a non-
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destructive incident. The damages done in destructive cyberattack incidents 
do not yet have an adequate model for accurately measuring the economic 
impact to the attacked entity or the ripple effect to the local, regional and 
global economy. 116 
Despite the source of opinion, the consensus is that malicious cyber 
incidents, regardless of the information stolen or damages incurred, cost 
billions of dollars each year. Further, the number of people directly or 
indirectly affected by cyber theft increases with each incident.117 In only one 
of the cases examined, malicious cyber exploitation on JP Morgan Chase the 
total number of households and businesses affected topped 80 million.118 This 
incident is recognized as one of the largest computer network exploitation 
breaches ever discovered.119 What the reports about this and other incidents 
sometimes fail to adequately describe is that using 80 million as a metric 
does not fully express the severity of the incident. For each business and 
household affected, 76 million and seven million respectively, there are 
between one and hundreds, if not thousands, of people and other businesses 
affected, as second and third order effects.120  
If the current assessments of the relative costs of these incidents are 
correct, and the number of people affected by these malicious cyber activities 
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approaches the hundreds of millions, the question remains: why is the public 
and government reaction to these malicious cyber incidents so lackluster?121 
Is there a failure in the assessments regarding cyber theft as a threat to the 
economy? The reason for the lack of a coherent consistent approach to these 
events is most likely caused by a multitude of complex factors that are 
situation and time dependent. One of the more prominent factors that likely 
cause the government to react is the presence or absence of public concern. 
However, using public concern as a metric for determining what actions the 
government should take does not capture the complexity of either the JP 
Morgan Chase computer network exploitation or the Sony cyberattack.  
As we consider what impact malicious cyber activities have on the 
economy it is easy to focus on the issue through the lens of monetary cost, e.g. 
cost to companies and individuals in the form of loss through theft, damages, 
potential revenue losses, increased competition and other impacts. It is much 
more difficult to consider malicious cyber activities as a potentially serious 
threat to the stability of the U.S. economy. Despite the abstract nature of the 
cyber threat, there are weaknesses in the economic system, which, if enacted 
upon, could have far reaching effects. The government has responded to 
similar threats to the stability of the economy in the past. During the 2008 
economic crisis, the U.S. government reacted by providing massive 
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government aid to banking institutions.122 By some assessments, without 
intervention there would have been a much more severe effect on the U.S. 
economy, and, as a reflection, the global economy.123  
Literature Review 
There is a vast body of opinions regarding how the government should 
respond to malicious cyber activities. In the last fifteen years in particular, 
the government has increased its level of attention on the issue of malicious 
cyber activities, on not only government and military systems, but private 
industry as well. This expansion of attention suggests that there is a 
consensus regarding when the government should take action. In fact, there 
are many ideas regarding how to govern the Internet and those governance 
types each suggest different responses. 
This literature review helps identify some of the ideas that resonate in 
the literature regarding the appropriate response to malicious cyber 
activities. The review focused on themes that capture ideas about the proper 
response to cyber incidents that are a risk to national security and in 
particular those cyber incidents that could have disruptive effects for the 
economy. Where possible, the literature review attempts to show the most 
common suggested responses to malicious cyber activities. To limit the review 
to a reasonable number of ideas they have been binned into three overarching 
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categories that help manage the concepts. These concepts are used to model 
the possible governance approaches where they might suggest ways to stop 
and respond to malicious cyber activities. 
Polycentric Response Approach 
There are multiple viewpoints regarding how to manage response to 
malicious cyber activities the Internet. One of the most discussed ideas to 
respond to malicious cyber activities is polycentric governance.124 Polycentric 
responses accept the heterogeneous nature of the cyber domain.  This type of 
response approach assumes cooperative actions by individuals, states, and 
international bodies in part because none have full ownership or 
management over the entire domain.125 This response model is consistent 
with the current ownership of the Internet. 
The polycentric governance model suggests that malicious cyber 
incident response would be best through cooperative actions based on pre-
negotiated rules and standards that establish the behavior norms that define 
acceptable and unacceptable behavior.126 The concept is based on the idea 
that through the development of cyber norms, Internet users will maintain 
security through best practices and cyber incident responses would be a 
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multi-vector group effort. The importance of private industry in this type of 
response model is acknowledged when looking at a polycentric model.127  
Some of the studies focus on polycentricism within the state itself.128 
These studies look at interaction between the state and commercial or private 
actors in regulating the Internet. The model presents a view where malicious 
cyber incidents are responded to in a collaborative effort with representatives 
from the government and interested industry parties to determine a 
resolution. In this concept, the model accepts a relationship between the state 
and private industry that is required to respond to complex incidents. The 
model suggests that through the division of labor the state and the private 
sector can respond more effectively. Some even suggest that the lead for 
cybersecurity in many instances is industry, with the state serving only in a 
limited role.129 Regardless of the exact approach in executing the polycentric 
response approach, cooperation amongst the various members of the response 
team is paramount. 
In other examples of polycentric approaches, the multipronged 
governance structure accounts for the global nature of the cyber domain by 
suggesting that states, businesses, individuals, and international bodies must 
work together to maintain the integrity of the system.130 This approach 
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expands the polycentric governance model to a larger global scale through 
bilateral and multilateral security and conduct agreements. This model looks 
to respond to malicious cyber incidents through the enforcement of rules and 
laws.131  
The strength of the polycentric approach is acceptance of plurality of 
ownership, the lack of defined borders and boundaries, and the complexity of 
the interconnectedness of the cyber domain, all of which provide a wide 
variety of cyber incident response options.132 The expanded nature of the 
governance model would also broaden the proliferation of cybersecurity 
solutions to all stakeholders. Through cooperation, this model suggests a 
strength-in-numbers approach. This appears to be a relevant approach, 
assuming all of the stakeholders have the same priorities. 
Multipronged or polycentric governance response modes downplay the 
difficulty of resolving complex issues with multiple stakeholders of varying 
motivations. Because of these complexities some of the literature suggests 
that traditional regulatory and legal procedures will not work.133 This would 
in turn limit any possibilities for cyber incident response and, without a new 
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form of regulating that is able to come to a consensus on priorities, the idea of 
polycentric or multipronged governance may not be viable.134  
State Centric Response Approach 
These solutions seek government action through legislation that 
involves centralizing control over government cybersecurity, improving cyber 
governance procedures, promoting cyber norms and encouraging private 
sector participation with a government lead.135 This approach assumes that 
through regulation the needs for cyber incident response will decrease 
through deterrence.  
State centric response approaches focus on managing cyber incidents 
on state controlled networks and the extension of state controlled response 
mechanisms to the private sector in emergencies. 136  The state centric 
approach implies that state controlled networks are of higher priority for 
response that the security of critical infrastructure owned by private 
industry. This approach does not present reasonable response options 
because most of the critical infrastructure resides on private networks. 
Rather, these approaches look to developing methods to defend state 
controlled networks in an attempt to manage critical nodes.  
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While there have been multiple proposals for making this achievable, 
to date, the concept is still very difficult to implement.137 This approach is an 
attempt to provide response options through the centralization of command 
and control for government networks such as the Department of Homeland 
Security, the State Department, and the Defense Department. Because 
numerous stakeholders want to maintain control over their individual 
networks the implementation of standardized security practices by 
governments can be difficult.138  
In theory, a centralized government cybersecurity response structure 
for would enable the government to respond to cyber incidents more 
efficiently. However, this approach also reduces the control of the individual 
stakeholders such as the State Department or Defense Department over their 
own networks. The state centric response model also has one major shortfall 
because it ignores the interconnectedness of the private sector with its 
networks though partnerships, contracts, and physical infrastructure.  
State centric governance writings are strong in their assessment of the 
government to manage cyber incident response for state controlled 
networks. 139  The literature acknowledges some of the difficulties of 
responding to cyber incidents specifically with regard to ownership of the 
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Internet structure. Through the recognition of the difficulties the literature 
attempts to narrow response options to specific portions of the Internet. 
Limiting the response options to specific sets of the Internet allows the 
authors to present methods for responding to cyber incidents.140  
The shortfalls in these writings with regard to response modeling is a 
lack of inclusion of various risk factors such as international laws, the needs 
of multiple sovereign states and the continuously evolving structure of the 
Internet. They also lack an appreciation for the fact that centralized solutions 
will be difficult to implement in an amorphous domain. 
Active Defense Response Approach 
One of the more compelling response options is the active defense 
approach. This model manifested in different ways. In some the response 
option presented options for proactive retaliation against a malicious actor, 
while other options suggested diverting a malicious actor to a controlled 
network. Other ideas postulated setting cyber deterrence aside and adopting 
a full war-fighting posture.141 Each of these ideas presented methods for 
responding to cyber incidents in a much more proactive manner than those 
presented in the polycentric or state centric response approaches. The active 
defense approach looked more toward moving to a war-fighting posture in the 
                                            
140 Contreras, Jorge L., Laura Denardis, and Melanie Teplinsky. (June 2013): 1113-1130. 
Flowers, Angelyn, and Sherali Zeadally. (June 2014). 
Hunker, Jeffrey. (2010): 197-216.  
141 Harknett, Richard J., John P. Callaghan, and Rudi Kauffman. (January 2010): 1-24. 
  
 49 
cyber domain and searching for a way to define the justification for military 
action in the cyber domain.142 
This approach in a response model appears rational given the potential 
negative effects of malicious cyber incidents. One of the more complex 
problems with this approach is the lack of precedent for the conduct of war in 
the cyber domain.143 Current cyber defense, cyber strategy and cyber policy, 
the doctrine, training, methodologies, tactics, techniques and procedures are 
far from perfected which lends to multiple problems in implementing an 
active defense posture.144 Some of the literature even suggests that active 
defense response activities could be more detrimental to the defender than 
the attacker. Active defense responses are easily misconstrued as attacks 
rather than defense, potentially escalating the event further, even risking 
actions spilling over the physical world.145 
The active defense argument has some strengths in driving the 
conversation of response options. One of those is identifying a need to 
categorize malicious activities in a way that allows for building response 
options ahead of time. These options would have to be built to respond in a 
manner appropriate for the risk and damage the malicious cyber activity may 
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cause. In the active defense model the state and its needs, which in many 
cases is much easier to control and manage are more prominent but the 
model must also account for private requirements as well.146  The main 
shortfall in an active defense that is state centric are the implications of 
hardening government-controlled networks without finding a way to help the 
private infrastructure those networks ride on.147  
Case Studies 
The case studies presented were selected to gauge the reactions of the 
general populous, the U.S. government, and the private sector. The cases 
were chosen to represent two different types of events. The 2014 Sony event 
represents a suspected attack on a publically traded company with an 
apparent attempt to coerce Sony leadership to take specific actions. In 
contrast, the 2014 JP Morgan Chase incident resulted in the apparent theft 
of millions of customers’ account and personal information. Each case is 
examined to determine what the consequences of the incident are and the 
subsequent actions the companies and the government took to respond to 
those incidents.  
2014 Sony Cyberattack 
The November 2014 cyberattack on Sony was not the first the company 
experienced. However, this cyberattack was one that Sony, the U.S. 
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Government and the public would see as a new level of threat.148 The level of 
penetration by the perpetrators became apparent to Sony, the FBI and, 
consequently, the public when the hackers began systematically stealing data 
and crippling the remains of Sony’s computer networks. The hackers also 
issued threats to Sony employees and the public through targeted emails.149  
Even before the attacks were known, the FBI asserts the hackers had 
been on Sony networks for more than two months.150 During this time, the 
FBI states that the hackers conducted network mapping and preparation 
activities that allowed them to ex-filtrate roughly 100 terabytes of 
information during the final attack phase.151  
The attacks were detected by the FBI in late November and 
subsequently revealed a severe breach of the Sony network, as well as the 
theft of terabytes of data, including business communications, movies, and 
personal information for employees and celebrities. 152  Following the 
intrusion, Sony contacted the FBI to inform them of the incident, which did 
not initially draw serious concern on the part of the government.153 Shortly 
after the notification of the FBI, the attackers leaked the stolen information 
in an apparent attempt to harm Sony. The attackers began the leaks through 
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the release of several movies, and continued with batch releases of 
information on 1 December and 3 December.154 Just before the third release 
of information, the FBI was able to confirm threatening emails sent to Sony 
personnel from the purported perpetrator of the cyberattacks, North 
Korea.155  
By Thursday, 18 December, the White House issued a statement 
indicating that the President was taking the incident as a serious matter and 
that the U.S. government may be conducting a response with proportional 
effect.156 This announcement was just days after a related anonymous threat 
was released that proposed 9-11 style attacks on movie theaters if they 
screened the Sony produced movie The Interview.157 Further, the government 
took cooperative actions such as seeking assistance from the Chinese 
government and issuing sanctions against North Koreans.158  
The government response was described as unprecedented, despite 
contrasting views on the actual economic impacts of the attacks. Some 
experts pegged the costs to Sony in the $100 million dollar range while the 
CEO of Sony assessed the costs would be closer to $35 million dollars.159 
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Following the announcement of the attacks, Sony stock experienced a minor 
drop of .43%. Despite the immediate monetary effects, the losses were mostly 
recovered within a couple months.160  
2014 JP Morgan Chase Computer Network 
Exploitation 
In 2014, JP Morgan Chase was the victim of a malicious computer 
network exploitation that breached and exploited their corporate network. 
According to reports, the JP Morgan Chase breach was one of the largest ever 
reported. 161  The Wall Street Journal reported that the breach affected 
roughly 76 million households and 7 million businesses.162 One of the notable 
features of this security breach is the timeline of the incidents that took 
place. There was roughly a two-month lag from when the security breach was 
detected, to the time JP Morgan Chase identified the problem, to when they 
were able to stop it. In brief, the intrusion began in mid-June 2014 when 
nefarious actors accessed servers containing customer contact information.163 
The perpetrators maintained persistent access to the servers until mid-
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August, by some accounts gaining access to and stealing gigabytes of 
sensitive information.164 Other reports insist that the malicious actors were 
stopped before they could remove customer data from servers but not before 
removing files containing information that could possibly help breach the 
system in the future.165  
Before JP Morgan Chase intervened, reports indicate the malicious 
actors infiltrated roughly 90 servers.166 When JP Morgan Chase recognized 
the network breach, they directed additional resources to deny continued 
access. Glazer reported that the response team assembled by JP Morgan 
Chase included 20 bank executives and roughly 200 personnel in the 
technology and cybersecurity team.167 Despite the tenacious efforts by the JP 
Morgan Chase cybersecurity team, it took several weeks to completely block 
the malicious activities on their network.168 Finally, at the end of August, JP 
Morgan Chase announced that it was working with law enforcement to 
investigate the incident. Despite several assessments that point to indicators 
of Russian activities, as of late 2014 there is still no concrete evidence that 
identifies the perpetrators.169 
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The incident, like others in recent times, prompted several immediate 
effects. The first notable effect was the forcing of JP Morgan Chase to 
reallocate significant resources to stopping the malicious actors.170 This is a 
relevant factor because the breach took place despite JP Morgan Chase 
employing approximately 1,000 people and investing roughly $250 million 
per year on cybersecurity.171 As previously noted, the bank redirected a 
significant percentage of their cybersecurity and executive team to 
specifically attend to this cyber breach.172 Part of that response team was 
dedicated to attempting to attribute the malicious activities to the 
perpetrator.173 
Following JP Morgan Chase’s announcement of the breach, the 
company’s stock also took a slight hit, falling 0.89%; in today’s dollars and 
company value, this equates to a roughly $20 million loss.174 While not a 
substantial figure, considering their market capitalization of $225.45 billion 
there is potential for a significant market reaction.175 One of the factors that 
likely reduced market reaction was, unlike previous malicious cyber 
exploitations on other institutions such as Target and Home Depot, the data 
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breach incurred did not include financial records but rather customer contact 
information.176  
Analysis 
The limited data for examples of government response to malicious 
cyber incidents, much of which might be attributed to the infancy of the 
Internet, increases the challenge to identify which of the response options, if 
any, may be effective. This expansion of attention to malicious cyber 
incidents suggests that there is a consensus regarding when the government 
should take action. This assumption is far from correct, as the complexities of 
each incident, including the perpetrator and the systems affected, change the 
potential effects and the possible response options because of multiple legal 
issues. 177 
Response in a Polycentric Model 
The Sony and JP Morgan Chase cases provide evidence of contrasting 
responses by the government. In the case of Sony, the response by the 
company focused on saving its reputation and maintaining the ability to 
conduct business.178 In this respect, the JP Morgan Chase response was 
similar. One difference in Sony’s response is the limited focus by Sony to 
attribute the attack to its perpetrator.179 One reason Sony did not have to 
respond in the same way resonated from the response of the U.S. 
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government. In the Sony case, the government responded very quickly, 
indicating attribution to the North Korean government and publically 
condemning them for the attack.180 The government even went so far as to 
suggest they would take proportional response actions against North 
Korea.181  
In direct contrast, the government responded to JP Morgan Chase in 
an almost hostile manner. JP Morgan Chase, looking to maintain its 
reputation, notified the government of the incident. The government sent two 
teams of FBI personnel to assist in the investigation: one that specialized in 
criminal exploitation and one specializing in nation–state attacks. 182  JP 
Morgan Chase and the FBI looked to attribute the incident to a perpetrator, 
looking both for indicators of criminal and state sponsored malicious 
activities.183 Very quickly, the FBI decided that the malicious activities were 
conducted by criminal actors and discontinued the support of the nation-state 
specialized team.184 Despite the danger to the economy, there was no strong 
public condemnation of the perpetrators by the government.  
In the Sony case, the company appeared to embrace the polycentric 
approach. They worked with the government and the government was active 
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in taking a leadership position to defend the company. The government 
indicated that the reason they approached the situation with the level of 
attention they did was due to the threats made by the perpetrator that 
attempted to suppress the rights of Sony.185 The President even went so far 
as to sign an executive order to expand response options, including sanctions, 
in cases such as the Sony attack.186 In some ways, the government even 
stretched the polycentric approach model by seeking help from China to 
pressure the North Korean government.187 The inclusion of China into the 
government response model is consistent with previous policy such as the 
International Strategy for Cyberspace.188 
Response in a State Centric Model 
In both the Sony and the JP Morgan Chase events, the government 
worked in a cooperative model; however, there were indicators that Sony 
believed the government was the lead or preferred a more active leadership 
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role in the responses.189 Neither case was a solid example of a state centric 
response.  
Response in an Active Defense Model 
Only in the Sony attack was there a suggestion of retaliation. 
Retaliation is not necessarily reflective of an active defense; rather, an active 
defense suggests methods to mitigate attacks while they are in progress by 
using active measures against the attacker.190 Threats of retaliation are 
closer to conflict escalation activities. Only in the Sony case would an active 
defense model seem relevant. In this case, attribution was determined: a 
clear criterion necessary to conduct active defense actions.191 
Conclusion 
Each of the case studies appears, at face value, to represent a similar 
monetary loss to the companies affected ($20 and 30 million). The threat 
those losses pose to the economy should demand similar responses from the 
government and the companies involved in the response. The literature 
suggests that each of the responses followed a polycentric approach, which 
seems a logical method for both of the cyber incident scenarios. Given the 
potential threat to the country and critical infrastructure, the contrast 
between the degree of response to each incident by both companies and the 
government appears inverted, 
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If the literature is correct, the risk to the economy and critical 
infrastructure is much higher in the JP Morgan Chase cyber incident because 
of its interconnectivity with critical financial infrastructure (DHS includes 
financial institutions as an element of U.S. critical infrastructure). 192 
Further, the computer network exploitation on JP Morgan Chase is 
particularly concerning because a disruption to a major financial institution 
can have severe effects on the economic stability of the country and the world. 
In contrast, Sony is not considered part of the critical infrastructure nor was 
the attack on Sony assessed as one that would extend to other companies or 
other critical infrastructure.  
The strong government response in the Sony case appears to manifest 
from the ability of the government to place attribution on a nation-state 
rather than a criminal organization. Despite the government’s ability to 
attribute the acts and the initial condemnation, the follow through was 
lackluster, and, in some ways, further confused the government’s policy for 
cyber incident response. The government first issued a threat to retaliate 
proportionally to the attacks, and then followed with a suggestion that the 
attacks conducted by North Korea were only a form of cyber vandalism.193 
This mixed reaction only causes confusion as many would ask how do you act 
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proportionally to cyber vandalism, and what does that mean about U.S. cyber 
policy? 
It appears that despite contrasting views regarding the attribution of 
the Sony attack and the subsequent government response, the U.S. 
government does not have a way to fully assess the risk factors of 
cyberattacks.194 Some of this is due to problems with attribution, but, despite 
this factor, the contrasting responses between these two cases show that 
there needs to be more work in developing models that help decision makers 
take appropriate actions.195 These models must carefully consider the second 
and third order effects as well as alternative actor intent that may not be 
apparent on the surface. Regardless of the approach, future solutions need to 
address the current legal issues that hamper information sharing between 
the government and private industry.196 
The government and the private sector have been wrestling with the 
legal implications of the private/government ownership and management of 
the Internet. Work to date, including the roadmap for collaborative action 
and the comprehensive cyber initiative; have yet to produce real methods for 
                                            
194 Berghel, H. (February 2015): 77-80. 
195 Ashford, Warwick. (April 14, 2015): 4. 
Forsyth Jr., James Wood, and Maj Billy E. Pop. "Structural Causes and Cyber Effects: A Response to Our Critics." 
Strategic Studies Quarterly (International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center) 9, no. 2 (September 
2015): 99-106. 
196 Fischer, Eric A., Edward C. Liu, John W. Rollins and Catherine A. Theohary. (December 2013). 
Givens, Austen D., and Nathan E. Busch. "Integrating Federal Approaches to Post-Cyberattack Mitigation." Journal 
Of Homeland Security & Emergency Management (International Security & Counter Terrorism Reference Center) 
10, no. 1 (April 2013): 1-28. 
  
 62 
integrating risk assessment with polycentric response approaches vital to 
mitigating attacks in a hyperconnected world.197  
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Chapter 3: Threat to Critical Infrastructure 
Introduction 
This chapter serves to explore the risk to United States critical 
infrastructure as defined by the Department of Homeland Security by cyber 
actors using Computer Network Attack (CNA) techniques on networked 
computer command and control and supporting systems.198 Hypothesizing 
state actors such as China possess the capability to conduct crippling 
cyberattacks in U.S. critical infrastructure. The chapter will explore the risk 
by assessing malicious actor capabilities and intent, examining the 
vulnerability of the possible targets, the mitigations to those vulnerabilities 
currently in place, and the potential consequences of an attack. 
Finally, this chapter will attempt to rationalize potential mitigation 
techniques for the assessed vulnerabilities. The chapter presents a literature 
review, assesses a case study concluding that cyberattacks on U.S. critical 
infrastructure are possible, wide scale full spectrum cyber warfare is 
unlikely, and the threat that state actors pose to the U.S. infrastructure is 
real, and requires further attention. 
The cyber domain is unique in that it is the first man made 
warfighting domain, comprising a mix of hardware, software and people that 
continues to expand at an almost immeasurable pace. Like any other domain, 
man quickly began to look for ways to use this domain to improve its 
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capability to wage warfare. First, integrating cyber technologies to 
communicate, detect enemy systems, and direct friendly systems and, 
eventually, developing ways to defend attack or exploit the adversary 
systems.  
In the cyber domain, the enemy is transparent, attack can resemble 
defense, defense can resemble attack, and seemingly, benign activity can 
have grave effects. Attacks in the cyber domain often do not have a 
correlating effect in the physical world. This has implications for both the 
attacker and the defender. The attacker often cannot assess damage and 
defenders cannot easily assess whether the activity was an attack. Even if 
the defenders determine it was an attack, they often cannot determine who 
attacked.199  
The outlined factors and others being discovered by researchers, make 
malicious activities that are effective in this microsecond potentially 
ineffective in the next. These challenges will continue to undermine the 
ability of any actor to wage war in the cyber domain at least in the near 
future. Despite the difficulty of waging full-scale cyber warfare, malicious 
cyber activities do pose a threat to national security, particularly in the area 
of economic security. These threats manifest through the theft of intellectual 
property and threats to critical infrastructure using network-connected 
systems as vulnerabilities. Despite the low probability of cyber warfare in the 
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near term, the United States must prepare for the reality of the threat 
because potential adversaries are preparing themselves. 
 “The time for fundamental change in the battlefield – the arena 
of war – is not far off. Before very long, a network war or a 
nanometer war might become a reality in our midst, a type of 
war that nobody even imagined in the past. It is likely to be very 
intense, but with practically no bloodshed. Nevertheless it is 
likely to determine who is the victor and who is the vanquished 
in an overall war.” 200 
Literature Review 
Because of the relative infancy of the cyber domain, there is limited 
work that specifically explores the consequences of a cyberattack to critical 
infrastructure as a mechanism for justifying war. In an attempt to conduct a 
complete analysis, the literature reviewed contains five main topics. These 
topics are technical threats, the threat actors and their intents as well as 
likely targets and their vulnerabilities. Examining cyberattack consequences 
and current policies rounds out the review. 
Technical Threats 
The literature available on the technical threat to critical 
infrastructure is quite vast. To narrow the scope, focus was placed on the 
most recent studies of the Chinese state-sponsored activities. Through 
examinations of the Mandiant report, which looked specifically at the vast 
capabilities the Chinese have with regard to computer network exploitation 
and a McAffee study that also looked at Chinese capabilities through a 
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different approach, the various technical threats to critical infrastructure 
were assessed.201 The latest reports on asymmetric attack vectors were also 
explored.  
Threat Actors' Capabilities and Intent 
The literature discussing threat actors is extensive. To narrow the 
study the literature review focused on the malicious Chinese cyber threat. 
The literature reviewed focuses on the categorization of threat actors. This 
provided insight on the degree of sophistication a threat actor must possess to 
conduct attacks on complex systems such as those found within critical 
infrastructure computer systems. One of the seminal documents was a 
Defense Science Board (DSB) study that helped to codify threat actors to 
narrow the focus.202 The assessed threat actor was narrowed to the Chinese 
by examining Mandiant report congressional testimony and other resources 
such as the book Unrestricted Warfare China’s Master Plan to Destroy 
America.203 The China threat was chosen because it fell within a high threat 
Tier and their scope of detected and analyzed activities meets a threshold 
that could quickly manifest into physical, rather than virtual, consequences. 
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Threat Targets and Vulnerabilities 
Possible targets and vulnerabilities were assessed through studies 
such as the congressional look into electrical grid vulnerabilities, and the 
North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Technical Analysis 
of the 2003 blackout.204 The focus narrowed the threat to the electrical grid as 
the most likely target for attack.205 Because of its antiquated structure, 
increasing number of remote operated computer controlled systems, and the 
intolerance the system has for minor disruptions, the electric grid contains 
the highest risk of substantial disruption.  
Attack Consequences and Mitigations 
To understand attack consequences, studies such as the Brookings 
paper on U.S. port and cyber vulnerabilities and congressional testimony 
were used to gather data regarding the assessed consequences of an attack on 
the electrical grid.206 Other studies were also used to provide context for a 
nuclear power plant failure and the possibility of attacking computer 
controlled equipment in hardened facilities. 207  Current U.S. government 
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strategies for cybersecurity were reviewed, as well as reports to Congress 
that provide context to the current mitigations in place and those that could 
be put into place.208 
Current Policy on Cyberattacks 
For a complete understanding of the policy implications cyberattacks 
have on critical infrastructure and the current posture of those, documents 
were reviewed from the National Security Strategy to the Department of 
Defense Strategy for Operating in Cyber Space and Department of Homeland 
Security strategy.209 The policies of the U.S. government and its agencies 
were considered along with the needs and requirements of the private 
sector.210 This was especially critical because currently the vast majority of 
networks, including those of the U.S. government, ride on private or 
corporate owned infrastructure.211 The very nature of the networks poses an 
important set of challenges regarding the justification for implicating a 
malicious actor for committing an act of war and the subsequent justification 
for retaliation. 
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Threat Assessment Process 
The Defense Science Board suggests a threat assessment model where 
risk is a function of the threat to a given target, the target’s vulnerabilities 
and the consequences of a successful attack on the target.212 The model itself 
is a standard representation that helps provide context to the terms used to 
describe the risk parameters such as threat, vulnerabilities, and 
consequences. Each of these terms has implications for both the friendly force 
and the opposition (see figure 1). 
Figure 1: Risk Management Parameters 213 
 
By having a common frame, the risk can be assessed by weighing 
parameters such as the opposing forces’ intent and capabilities against the 
friendly forces’ ability to deter and disrupt the opposing force threat. This 
model was considered when organizing the discussion regarding the risk to 
targets within U.S. critical infrastructure from the threat of Cyberattacks. 
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Malicious Cyber Activity Types 
Assessing the threat to critical infrastructure requires understanding 
the types of activity cyber actors’ conduct that may affect the systems that 
control and support the infrastructure. The popular media and even 
academia often misattribute some of these activities as cyberattacks. This 
misrepresentation could skew risk assessments to indicate an increased 
threat, thus exaggerating the likelihood of the consequences. It is particularly 
important to understand the types of activities that could be construed as 
attacks because the true Chinese threat is masked by the actual 
categorization of their activities as exploitation, intrusion and theft rather 
than the sensationalized use of computer network attack. 
Some of the activities represented as Computer Network Attack (CNA) 
are more accurately Computer Network Exploitation (CNE). These activities 
represent several types of unauthorized and often illegal computer or 
network access. CNE can represent multiple activities such theft, hijacking, 
manipulation, or espionage.214 Each of these activities, in most instances, 
does not cause physical destruction or disablement of the computer or system 
that is accessed, but, rather, the use of the system to gain a specific end the 
cyber actor intends without the expressed permission of the system owner.  
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In contrast to CNE, CNA is the deliberate destruction or disablement, 
either permanent or repairable, to a computer or network.215 While CNE can 
be a threat to a company, country or person they are not intended to cause a 
physically manifested negative outcome like CNA. These outcomes can 
manifest themselves through network or system failures that cause critical 
infrastructure (such as power, water, transportation systems) to temporarily 
or permanently fail.216 CNA is fundamentally different because the intent is 
to cause damage or disablement of a computer or network, an action that 
could be construed as an act of war.217 
Table 1, below, describes some of the ways CNA is conducted to cause 
negative effects on networked systems. While not a complete list of threat 
sources, the table provides information on some of the more basic types and 
techniques used to conduct malicious activities on target networks. This is an 
important baseline of information because it represents some of the 
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Table 1: Types and Techniques of Cyberattacks 218 
 
While CNA could be construed, as described above, as an act of war, 
most of the activities conducted thus far by the Chinese have fallen outside of 
the current description of acts of war and are better defined as illegal acts of 
theft. The following quote describes one opinion of when CNA would be an act 
of war. 
“Planting a malicious virus in the computer network of an enemy 
can thus be highly effective to win advantage in military 
operations. This would be one method of cyberspace warfare. The 
intent with which such interference is carried out entitles it to be 
                                            
218 Defense Science Board. (January 2013).  
Threat Source Description 
Botnet A network of remotely controlled systems used to coordinate attacks and 
distribute malware, spam, and phishing scams. Bots (short for ‘robots’) are 
programs that are covertly installed on a targeted system allowing an 
unauthorized user to remotely control the compromised computer for a 
variety of malicious purposes. 
Denial of Service A method of attack that denies system access to legitimate users without 
actually having to compromise the targeted system. From a single source, 
the attack overwhelms the target computers with messages and blocks 
legitimate traffic. It can prevent one system from being able to exchange 
data with other systems or prevent the system from using the internet. 
Distributed 
Denial of Service 
A variant of the denial-of-service attack that uses a coordinated attack from 
a distributed system of computers rather than a single source. It often 
makes use of worms to spread to multiple computers that can then attack 
the target. 
Exploit Tools Publically available and sophisticated tools that intruders of various skill 
levels can use to determine vulnerabilities and gain entry into targeted 
systems. 
Logic Bomb A form of sabotage in which a programmer inserts code that causes the 
program to perform a destructive action when some triggering event 
occurs, such as terminating the programmer’s employment. 
Malware Malicious software designed to carry out annoying or harmful actions. 
Malware often masquerades as a useful program or is embedded into 
useful programs, so that users are induced into activating programs. Can 
also be installed without the user’s knowledge to surreptitiously track or 




classified as an ‘attack’ in the sense of article 51 of the UN 
Charter which thus activates the right of self-defense.” 219 
Threat Background  
Malicious cyber activities target a wide variety of networked and 
stand-alone devices, ranging from individual electronic components to 
complex systems and systems of systems. While there is a multitude of 
vulnerable systems, the United States Critical Infrastructure is increasingly 
at risk due to the very advances in technology that improve its capability and 
capacity.220 As critical infrastructures modernize, manual control processes 
are often upgraded to supervisory control and data acquisition systems 
(SCADA).221 In the past, these industrial control systems (ICS) resided on 
internal networks and relied heavily on human controlled manual 
processes. 222  As these systems convert to SCADA, they integrated into 
networks to improve services and production while reducing the required 
human operators. 223  The increase of networked systems in critical 
infrastructure ICS such as production and distribution of water, power, sewer, 
oil, and natural gas have increased the ability for malicious actors to obtain 
access to SCADA systems.224  
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There are multiple possible threat actors: radical individuals, self-
funded terrorist groups, and state funded cyberattack teams.225 Each of these 
groups represents a possible threat to critical infrastructure; however, state-
funded cyberattack teams represent the most critical threat. 226  State 
sponsored teams can use their capabilities to create vulnerabilities in the 
SCADA systems of critical infrastructure. 227  By creating vulnerabilities, 
state-sponsored threat actors can hold those systems at risk. Exploiting 
critical infrastructure can cause severe risk to a country’s ability to conduct 
war, cause financial crisis, and in extreme instance loss of life.228  
To understand the source of potential cyber threats the Defense 
Science Board broke them down into six categories outlining the description 
of the threat posed by each group. It is important to understand the 
difference each threat poses to assess the potential risk to critical 
infrastructure. The diversity of the group creates dilemmas for defining, 
deterring and responding to them. 
Hactivists - Hacktivism refers to politically motivated attacks on 
publically accessible Web pages or e-mail servers. These groups and 
individuals overload e-mail servers and hack into web sites to send a political 
message.229 
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Hackers - Hackers sometimes crack into networks for the thrill of the 
challenge or for bragging rights in the hacker community. While remote 
cracking once required a fair amount of skill or computer knowledge, hackers 
can now download attack scripts and protocols from the Internet and launch 
them against victim sites. Thus, attack tools have become more sophisticated 
and easier to use.230 
Criminal Groups - There is an increased use of cyber intrusions by 
criminal groups to attack systems for monetary gain.231 
Insiders - Working from within an organization, the insider threat 
can be intentional or unintentional. Insiders may not need a great deal of 
knowledge about computer intrusions because their knowledge of a victim 
system often allows them to gain unrestricted access to cause damage to the 
system or to steal system data. The insider threat remains one of the most 
significant cyber threats to the Department of Defense (DoD). The insider 
threat can also include contractor personnel.232 
Terrorists - Terrorists seek to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit critical 
infrastructure to threaten national security, cause mass casualties, weaken 
the U.S. economy, and damage public morale and confidence. However, 
                                            





traditional terrorist adversaries of the United States are less developed in 
their computer network capabilities state actors.233 
Foreign Intelligence Services - Foreign intelligence services use 
cyber tools as part of their information gathering and espionage activities. 
According to the Director of National Intelligence, “a growing array of state 
and non-state adversaries are increasingly targeting – for exploitation and 
potential disruption or destruction – information infrastructure, including 
the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and 
embedded processors and controllers in critical industries.”234 
Threat actors create vulnerabilities by using unauthorized methods to 
intrude into computer systems. Once the cyber actors intrude into the 
system, they assess the system for vulnerabilities and either use previously 
developed malicious code or code and methods developed specifically for the 
victim system to damage, disrupt or destroy the software or hardware.  
Mandiant’s APT1 report recently brought to light one of the most 
aggressive state sponsored cyber threats an assertion that has been attested 
to by congressmen Rogers and Dutch in their Investigative Report on U.S. 
National Security Issues. “China has the means, opportunity, and motive to 
use telecommunications companies for malicious purposes.”235 
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APT1 analyzed massive intellectual property (IP) theft and implicated 
China in sponsoring the cyber actors conducting the activities.236  While 
Mandiant’s report focuses on China’s cyber espionage unit and the 
sophistication of the tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) China uses to 
exploit and pilfer U.S. companies, IP suggests they are an imminent threat to 
any networked system.237 The important thing to note from this report is the 
characterization of the intrusions as attacks. Reports such as these, although 
a superb representation of an in depth investigation into Chinese cyber 
intrusions and theft, provide little or no justification for characterizing their 
activities as attacks. 
The Defense Science Board suggests that state sponsored cyber teams 
have the most robust capabilities to exploit vulnerabilities and attack 
systems.238 The DSB uses a six-tier system to categorize possible threats.239 
These threats have also been evaluated to assess the nominal investment 
required to develop the capabilities and are grouped in three levels; tier I-II 
from a few dollars to a few thousand dollars, III-IV in the millions, V-VI in 
the billions.240  
Table 2, below, is representative of the Defense Science Board’s tier 
breakout that categorizes practitioners by level of sophistication.  
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Table 2: Malicious Cyber Actor Tier Levels 241 
 
Using the DSB developed tier system and the information constructed 
in several reports such as Mandiant’s APT1, the current known threat of the 
Chinese is in the level IV category. Tier IV status indicates that activity has 
been mostly expressed through cyber espionage and IP theft.242 While there is 
no current evidence to support the argument that China has developed full 
spectrum capabilities, their current capacity suggests an aspiration toward 
that goal. One of the noted issues that the Mandiant report and others 
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Tier I Practitioners who rely on others to develop the malicious code, 
delivery mechanisms, and execution strategy (use known 
exploits) 
Tier II Practitioners with a greater depth of experience, with the 
ability to develop their own tools (from publically known 
vulnerabilities) 
Tier III Practitioners who focus on the discovery and use of unknown 
malicious code, are adept at installing user and kernel mode 
root kits, frequently use data mining tools, target corporate 
executives and key users (government and industry) for the 
purpose of stealing personal and corporate data with the 
expressed purpose of selling the information to other criminal 
elements 
Tier IV Criminal or state actors, who are organized, highly technical, 
proficient, well-funded professionals working in teams to 
discover new vulnerabilities and develop exploits 
Tier V State actors who create vulnerabilities through an active 
program to “influence” commercial products and services 
during design, development or manufacturing, or with the 
ability to impact products while in the supply chain to enable 
exploitation of networks and systems of interest 
Tier VI States with the ability to successfully execute full spectrum 
(cyber capabilities in combination with all of their military and 
intelligence capabilities) operations to achieve a specific 




brought to light is the inherent difficulty in identifying the responsible threat 
actor beyond a reasonable doubt.243 The anonymity of the Internet provides 
even state actors the ability to conduct vast operations with virtual impunity. 
The recent report by Mandiant suggests that the APT1 cyber 
espionage unit examined consists of hundreds to thousands of individuals.244 
Provided this is only one of multiple possible units conducting cyber activities 
for China there is a strong possibility the full capacity of China to conduct 
cyberwar cannot be determined. However, the Mandiant report did provide 
the ability to hypothesize the possible damage China or other state sponsored 
actors could conduct given the assessed intrusions. Even a cursory 
assessment reveals that there have been compromises of industries that 
manage large portions of critical infrastructure including, transportation, 
navigation, satellites and telecommunication, and energy. Compromises, 
which if used to conduct an attack, could cause serious damage to national 
security. 
Threat Actor Capabilities and Intent  
Recent studies such as APT1, Operation Shady Rat, and the 2012 GAO 
study on economic espionage suggest that Chinese intentions focus on the 
theft of intellectual property.245 The intent of the theft is interpreted in 
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several ways. One suggestion might be that the theft is to gain military 
superiority by gaining advanced weaponry and assessing the vulnerabilities 
of U.S. weapons systems. A separate argument could be that by stealing data 
China can profit by reproducing products and edge the U.S. out of market 
share. A third argument might consider the theft espionage only if that 
information is being stolen to gain knowledge of U.S. intent.  
While all of these arguments are plausible, the shortsightedness of 
thinking only one of these possibilities is the intent behind Chinese malicious 
activities is naïve at best. In Unrestricted Warfare, the authors suggest that 
China looks to destroy the United States through asymmetric attack.246 
While true intent can only be assessed by observation of acts, the capabilities 
the Chinese have developed for CNE provide them with a high degree of 
access that should there be intent they could easily shift their approach from 
theft and espionage to disruption and damage. The very development of the 
capability to exploit or intrude into systems can be said to have expressed the 
intent to hold those systems at risk of attack.  
Targets within U.S. Critical Infrastructure  
U.S. critical infrastructure consists of thousands of facilities, hundreds 
if not thousands of networks, both privately and publically owned, consisting 
of everything from water storage and treatment to nuclear power facilities. 
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According to the Department of Homeland, defines “Critical infrastructure 
are the assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, so vital to 
the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a 
debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public 
health or safety, or any combination thereof.”247 The assets, systems, and 
networks that comprise the critical infrastructure are key targets to 
malicious state sponsored cyber actors. In most cases, these facilities are 
located in the U.S.; however, some facilities key to the U.S. are located in and 
even owned by other countries. By disrupting the services provided by these 
facilities, an opponent can cause varying degrees of harm from minor 
disruptions of service to full-scale shutdown of power, water or other critical 
services. 
Target Vulnerabilities both Inherent and Introduced 
There have been multiple assessments of various parts of U.S. critical 
infrastructure to determine the level of vulnerability. In one, Congress 
conducted a survey of over 100 utility companies, which concluded that the 
U.S. electrical grid is vulnerable to attack.248 One of the findings noted that 
the companies surveyed reported their information systems either 
continuously probed for vulnerabilities or are routinely under attack by 
malicious actors.249 General Alexander, Director of the National Security 
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Agency, remarked that on a scale of one to 10 with 10 being the most 
prepared, U.S. critical infrastructure is only a three.250  
Mandiant has perhaps best described the threat to critical 
infrastructure though its assessment of APT1. In the comprehensive but 
limited assessment, Mandiant identified 141 victims of compromise across a 
broad area of industry including some that contain networks in critical 
infrastructure.251 Access these compromises afford can be used to conduct 
disruptive or destructive activities. 
 “The threat posed to U.S. national-security interests by 
vulnerabilities in the telecommunications supply chain is an 
increasing priority given: the country’s reliance on 
interdependent critical infrastructure systems; the range of 
threats these systems face; the rise in cyber espionage; and the 
growing dependence all consumers have on a small group of 
equipment providers.”252 
One of the key systems of systems in the U.S. critical infrastructure is 
the electrical grid. Because of the complexity of the system, small failures can 
have ripple effects proven to cause massive uncontrolled outages. In 2003, a 
rolling blackout occurred in the northeast United States and parts of Ontario, 
Canada due to a simple software glitch in an alarm system. As with many 
catastrophes, this very inconsequential glitch caused a failure that rippled 
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outward, causing damage to other systems and eventually shutting down the 
power in some places for up to two days.253 
Though the east coast outage was caused by imbalances in the network 
due to equipment failure, it provides a litmus test for how little would be 
required to cause serious outages, and even physical damage, to the grid. In a 
recent study, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission suggested that a 
coordinated attack on as few as nine substations could cause a collapse of the 
entire electric grid for an undetermined amount of time.254 While this study 
did not specifically look at cyberattack as a means for causing widespread 
destruction, it is an example of the limited number of disturbances in the 
system that might be required to cause such an effect. 
To understand the vulnerability to the grid a complex cyberattack of 
this kind should be assessed to determine if the same results might be found. 
In any attack, military planners would assess that the simpler the approach, 
the more likely the attacker will execute the attack as planned, thus having a 
direct impact on the likelihood of success. This is based on a simple principle 
that proposes the more variables in any equation, the greater the risk of 
miscalculation.  
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Consequences of an Attack both Fixable and Fatal 
In a recent paper that assessed the cyber threat to U.S. ports, the 
author suggested that an attack could cause serious consequences that could 
cause a ripple effect with far reaching consequences.255  
 “The potential consequences of even a minimal disruption of the 
flow of goods in U.S. ports would be high. The zero-inventory, 
just-in-time delivery system that sustains the flow of U.S. 
commerce would grind to a halt in a matter of days; shelves at 
grocery stores and gas tanks at service stations would run 
empty.”256  
While an interruption is a serious concern, a deliberate attack could 
affect the safety features built into the power plants that provide the 
electricity for the grid. The recent Stuxnet worm that was indicated in 
targeted attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities provides insight into the 
capabilities a Tier V actor (see Table 2 for definition) can bring to bear on 
adversaries systems. Stuxnet was designed to specifically seek out, infect and 
damage the centrifuges Iran is using to enrich Uranium.257 The skill and 
funding required to conduct the cyber exploit and the investment required to 
employ it could only have been doe by a state actor. 
In a very similar instance a state actor such as China, using the vast 
capabilities they currently have to remotely access computer networks in the 
United States, could develop and target controls that manage power plants. 
One of the more disconcerting of these would be a targeted attack on the 
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safety controls of nuclear plants. While these plants have multiple 
redundancies, they are designed to work in a specific manner with very little 
flexibility. A clever team of state actors could feasibly find the weakness in 
the system and cause a meltdown.  
Incidents such as Chernobyl and Three Mile Island provide analogous 
models proving the possibility of major incidents through minor failures. 
While in both of these incidents, there is a series of malfunctions and 
mistakes made by operators, a well-planned attack designed to provide false 
readings and manipulate computer controlled valves to replicate similar 
conditions could lead to a meltdown of unknown scale. These systems are 
continuously being upgraded to add remote operation capabilities; the 
vulnerabilities of these systems expand with each connection.  
Even in a limited attack scenario where the system is ultimately 
fixable, a targeted attack that affects the U.S. military apparatus to conduct 
operations might be construed as an act of war. However, there are issues 
with characterizing a Chinese cyberattack scenario on the U.S. electrical grid 
as act of war. The primary issue is the difficulty of proving who conducted the 
attack. Only then would retaliatory actions be acceptable. 
Current or Proposed Mitigation Techniques 
Given the relative infancy of the cyber domain, the U.S. has very little 
capability to defend the critical infrastructure. One of the more prominent 
factors that complicate the ability to defend SCADA networks for critical 
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infrastructure is their private ownership.258 The ability of the government to 
intrude into the privately owned networks of individuals and companies even 
for the purposes of defending them is outside current policy and acceptable 
behavior.  
With the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) in 
2009, the Department of Defense began to consolidate its cyber capabilities. 
CYBERCOM’s mission is to defend DoD networks and prepare to conduct full 
spectrum cyber operations. While CYBERCOM has worked diligently to 
develop and institute capabilities to defend DoD networks, the DoD does not 
have jurisdiction over most of the U.S. critical infrastructure, which leaves 
the privately owned portions more vulnerable to attack. To make matters 
more complicated, the Department of Homeland Security has the 
responsibility to find solutions to protect private networks and to collaborate 
with industry to meet that challenge. The encumbering misalignment of 
activities by the DoD and DHS causes further risk to critical infrastructure 
and alienates industry partners, ultimately decreasing cooperation. 
One of the challenges for the U.S. government will be to implement 
policies that promote the security and redundancy of critical networks while 
respecting the privacy afforded under the Constitution. The unique nature of 
the problem will also require the government to work closely with allies and 
partners to develop international security agreements, terms of acceptable 
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cyber activities, and, given the threat, an appropriate response to perceived 
cyberattack. The complexity of the Internet provides some mitigation through 
its continually growing and morphing structure.  
To increase the cooperation of privately held companies the 
government will need to continue to build partnerships with private industry. 
These cooperative partnerships are required to develop, and implement 
standards that create methodologies to maintain privacy while sharing 
critical cybersecurity information. The government should begin by 
standardizing the reporting of cyberattacks across the USG by providing 
industry one process and one place to provide and receive incident 
information. The implementation of this process has been started but there is 
more work to be done in developing cross industry communication. 
The government will also have to work more closely with the 
international community to develop acceptable standards of cyber conduct as 
well as develop legislation that provides funding or tax incentives to key 
industries that require heightened Cybersecurity measures to help manage 
implementation costs. This is particularly important for critical 
infrastructure owned by private industry.  
The first priority for the government should be to work with the 
international community to set acceptable norms of activities in cyberspace. 
Setting norms is critical to creating an environment where all parties act and 
  
 88 
react in a similar manner. Norms are also critical to avoid conflicts by 
providing common language to air grievances.  
The current climate between policymakers and industry suggests there 
is recognition of the need for policy change particularly within the area of 
critical infrastructure and the Defense Industrial Base (DIB). Despite a 
loosely agreed upon cybersecurity reality, there persists a lack of trust 
between industry and government regarding security standardization, 
reporting procedures and cost allocations. Because of this lack of trust, any 
policy that affects industry will likely fail. Likewise, international 
agreements are difficult to ratify because of differing legal systems and 
cultural norms. 
Despite the challenges presented by trust issues between industry and 
government and the complexities of developing international standards, there 
can be a managed way forward if government priorities change. The first 
change needed is for the government to conduct a full review of how industry 
interacts with each agency in partnership with those companies to determine 
best practices and align how the companies interact with government. The 
review should focus on changing what the government does to maximize its 
ability to assist industry and minimize cost to industry. This would include 
items such as streamlining incident reporting, decreasing required 
interactions with multiple agencies over the same incident or topic and 
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increasing the responsiveness and feedback industry receives for providing 
information to the government (return on investment). 
Government should move simultaneously to develop evolving 
standards to secure its own unclassified networks and provide those free of 
charge to all U.S. industry. Further, government should identify methods to 
identify and categorize critical private networks and develop legislation to 
provide financial incentives for those companies to increase the security of 
the networks.  
Finally, the government should continue to reach out to international 
institutions, both private and federally managed to build mutually acceptable 
agreements standardizing cyber norms. The proposed changes are in no way 
a comprehensive list but they do provide a stepping off point that the 
government can use to build a pathway of success for industry and the 
international community.  
Conclusion  
There is little doubt that in the complex and contested cyber domain 
there is a continued future for conducting malicious activities. The rate of 
expansion of networked connected devices used to manage critical 
infrastructure ensures continued exploitation. With this certainty comes the 
very real possibility that state sponsored cyber teams could reach a stage 
where full-scale cyberwar to disable, disrupt and even destroy U.S. critical 
infrastructure is possible.  
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 “Preserving flexibility of U.S. response by maintaining some 
measure of ambiguity is useful, so long as we make parameters 
clear by laying down certain markers or selected redlines whose 
breach will not be tolerated.” 259 
While the future threat seems viable, the evidence suggests that wide 
scale full spectrum cyber warfare is not currently feasible and even minor 
attacks to critical infrastructure in many cases are unpalatable due to 
unpredictable ripple effects. Despite the unlikeliness of full-scale cyber 
warfare, the government and industry must work together to implement 
cybersecurity measures to protect critical infrastructure. Developing more 
robust security measures has mutual benefits for industry and government. 
Measures will help industry to protect its IP and maintain its viability in the 
global market and it will help government to insure common security for the 
nation’s critical networks. 
Regardless of the current possibility of a full scale cyberwar, the threat 
that China poses to the U.S. infrastructure through its repeated CNE and IP 
theft have reached a level that the U.S. government must consider whether 
China has already committed acts of war thought the degradation of the U.S. 
military advantage. 260  The asymmetric warfare approach of death by a 
thousand cuts may very well be underway. The implications of intrusions to 
the computer systems that support the military infrastructure such as 
satellites and communications, the energy sector, aerospace, and science and 
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research, regardless of private ownership, need to be further scrutinized as 
the very ability for the U.S. to project power resides in the supporting 
infrastructure these industries provide. The U.S. must consider a new era 
where cyber domain plays a significant role in not only the prosecution of war 
























The intent of this thesis was to explore malicious cyber threats through 
three different, but related areas: cybersecurity policy to prevent and deter 
attacks, the policy attempts to respond to malicious cyber activities with 
economic implications both during and after the attack and the risk 
associated with cyberattacks to critical infrastructure. The approach to this 
thesis was taken to analyze multiple dilemmas facing cybersecurity 
particularly as it applies to policy development, implementation and 
response. The overarching attempt was to expose the challenges the 
cybersecurity policy community has been struggling with since the inception 
of the Internet.  
Chapter 1: Summary 
Through analysis of two malicious cyber incidents, various 
cybersecurity policy approaches proposed in the literature are applied in an 
attempt to find reasonable governance processes for enhancing cybersecurity. 
These approaches were analyzed because it appeared that despite the 
extensive work done in response to cyber threats from multiple state and 
non-state actors, to date those policies have failed to provide adequate 
preventative cybersecurity. Further, the chapter seeks to assess if there is a 
cyber policy approach that provides preventative cybersecurity. 
In a pure defense model the polycentric approach would likely be ideal 
because everyone with equity in the cyber domain commits to a security and 
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conduct framework willingly. The polycentric model, however, does not 
provide methods to thwart malicious cyber incidents. The state centric 
approach appears reasonable given the state is the normal body for defense of 
national assets; however, lack of jurisdiction limits implementation. Lastly, 
the active defense model is a conundrum in that active defense may in fact 
become offensive even though it implies a non-aggressive approach to 
implementing self-protection measures. 
While there are more types of governance methodologies that could be 
explored, of the three main categories of governance processes for 
implementing preventative cybersecurity none of them stood out as the 
premier solution. In fact, it is likely that the best possible method is probably 
a hybrid of all of the solutions depending on the exact portion of the Internet 
being protected. This is not to suggest that any of these governance 
methodologies have the capability to prevent malicious cyber incidents. There 
was no evidence that any policy process would have the capability to deter or 
prevent cyber exploitation or attacks from a determined malicious actor.    
Chapter 2: Summary 
The second chapter in this series hypothesizes that current cyber 
incident response options are not adequate and fundamental changes to 
response approaches must be made. Using the governance processes from the 
first chapter, this chapter assesses whether or not they are adequate in a 
cyber incident response scenario. These approaches are chosen because to 
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remain consistent with the overall thesis and test the most common 
governance approaches in response scenarios. 
The chapter tests this hypothesis through the examination two case 
studies one focused on a robust government response to a malicious cyber 
incident and a second where the government took a much less aggressive 
approach. These case studies were chosen to compare and contrast the 
government and private industry responses given the known and possible 
threat to the economy. 
The response to the two cyber incidents were opposite of what should 
have been expected given the relative threat to the economy and in this case 
an identified part of U.S. critical infrastructure. Though the government did 
respond in both cases there appeared to be a failure to evaluate the responses 
as factors of risk to national security. In fact, the response to the Sony attack 
appeared to be emotionally driven instead of threat driven.  
Chapter 3: Summary 
The final chapter in the series used a standard threat assessment 
model to assess malicious cyber actor capabilities, and intent. The chapter 
uses this methodology to examine the vulnerability of select targets. The 
chapter then assesses mitigations to those vulnerabilities currently in place, 
and finally the potential consequences of a cyberattack.  
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The chapter uses a power failure, not caused by a cyberattack, as an 
analog of a cyberattack to the electrical grid. The electrical grid was chosen 
because it is identified as a part of U.S. critical infrastructure, the SCADA 
systems used to manage the network are increasingly connected to the 
Internet, and there are examples of SCADA manipulation for state actor 
exploitation.  
Select mitigation techniques were evaluated for effectiveness and 
practicality of implementation. While not an all-encompassing assessment, 
the chapter concludes that there is a possibility that cyberattacks on U.S. 
critical infrastructure are possible current evidence suggests that wide scale 
full spectrum cyber warfare is unlikely. Further, because of the complexity of 
the SCADA systems even minor attacks to critical infrastructure in many 
cases is unpalatable to state actors because of unpredictable ripple effects 
that could cause unwanted escalation. Regardless of the current possibility of 
a full-scale cyberwar, the threat that state actors pose to the U.S. 
infrastructure is real and requires further attention.  
Final Thoughts 
Despite the relative infancy of the Internet, the response to 
cybersecurity, given the threat to critical infrastructure, the economy and 
private industry, is quite underwhelming. The depth of thought regarding 
cybersecurity including risk assessment, malicious cyber incident prevention, 
and response is quite extensive yet there seems to be no fundamental 
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breakthroughs in implementing any policies that properly assess cyber risk 
in a timely fashion, provide adequate defense or even response models.  
Part of the difficulty in making strides in cybersecurity is the lack of 
congressional action. The Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act or CISA has 
been through two congresses without resolution. Some may assume that lack 
of congressional organization is what is stalling cyber policy however the 
complexity of regulating the Internet is likely the reason that policy has not 
progressed.  There are far to many risks in violating both individual rights of 
Internet users and violating sovereign rights of other countries when 
deciding to implement regulations that will affect a system that is globally 
interconnected. 
The resolution of the sovereign control versus multi-stakeholder or 
polycentric governance models is one that will ultimately be played out over 
numerous rounds of negotiation.  In the end there will be some countries that 
move more toward a sovereign control model and some that will attempt to 
implement a global governance model. There are pitfalls in either but in 
order to maintain the global system a polycentric model is the only one that 
provides enough deterrent to malicious actors because in a cooperative 
polycentric model the odds of prosecution increase and reduce the safe-
havens bad actors currently take advantage of.  
The issue of active defense being used also complicates a system where 
there are sovereignty issues. The global nature of the Internet and the 
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entities that use it, such as international corporations, complicates any state 
run active defense system where the state uses sovereign rights in a system 
that is inherently difficult to draw sovereign boundaries. If the governance 
went to a polycentric model the active defense rights of each member could 
pre-coordinated, however implementing active defense would still be a 
monumental challenge that involves extensive carful negotiation to avoid 
inadvertent damage and even escalation. 
Organization of cyber defense is also muddled with various 
stakeholders and action arms from the National Security Agency to the 
Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
the Defense Department and Cyber Command not to mention the private 
firms who sell services to protect networks. While the resources are being 
allocated the organization and implementation does not appear aligned to 
drive the organizations into a successful model. In order to create a cyber 
defense model that works there should be changes made in the organization 
of the response force.  
One of the first changes that should be made is the division of the 
National Security Agency and CYBERCOM. This is a fundamentally flawed 
marriage that has two entities that have competing equities being run by the 
same leader. These types of organizations rarely work and in the business 
world are broken up to increase competition ultimately making both 
organizations healthier.   
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In contrast the activities of the Department of Homeland Security and 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation seem to be aligned well. While the FBI 
cyber defense and response teams could always use more funding, adding 
additional funds without addressing the organizational alignment issues with 
the whole of government will not resolve the overarching issue of resource 
allocation and capability alignment.  
One of the fundamental issues with the current governance processes 
is the failure to use existing risk assessment models. The contrast between 
the government response between the Sony and JP Morgan Chase case 
studies is a prime example of the imbalanced application of a risk 
assessment. Further, risk assessment model implementation needs to be 
more agile in assessing possible second and third order effects. This failure is 
apparent in the JP Morgan Chase case that where the government removed 
its state actor experts from the response team despite the risk to the economy 
had JP Morgan Chase been unable to rebuff the malicious actors. 
Another important issue future policy solutions must tackle is the 
current legal hurdles that hamper information sharing between the 
government and private industry. Ultimately, however, the most challenging 
problem is the structure of the current Internet. In order to secure the 
Internet there may need to be a fundamental change its base structure. 
While not a solution that seems cost effective, or in many ways even possible, 
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an alternate Internet designed from the ground up for security is a possible 
solution.  
One of the topics explored that warrant further research is the legal 
methodology for sharing threat information between the government and 
private industry. This one factor alone will suffice to provide countless 
doctoral papers, as the complexity of sharing information in the complex legal 
environment will continue to be a challenge. Secondly, the development a 
methodology for policymakers to make swift risk assessments with possible 
second and third order effects during cyber incidents would compliment 
current work already available and help drive appropriate reactions to future 
events. Finally, further work could be done in the area of cyber incidents in 
context of proportionality to determine what if any proactive (pre-attack) or 
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